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PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC
FIRMS: THE CASE FOR INCREASING
TRANSPARENCY
Martin Bengtzen*
ABSTRACT
While developments in the law of insider trading usually attract
significant scholarly interest, far less attention has been paid to the
design and effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
complementary Regulation Fair Disclosure. Yet, this Article argues
that the SEC’s current quandaries relating to insider trading
enforcement are largely self-inflicted and could have been avoided if
it had better aligned its Reg. FD with the Supreme Court’s insider
trading jurisprudence.
Introduced sixteen years ago to prevent senior officers of public
firms from leaking material information to preferred investors and
financial analysts, Reg. FD was designed to function as a backstop
for undesirable favoritism that insider trading law, as developed by
the Supreme Court, could not reach—in particular, the situation
where a corporate manager divulges valuable information to a
preferred investor not for any obvious personal benefit (which would
trigger insider trading law) but for the ostensible benefit of the firm.
This Article analyzes Reg. FD through the lens of private investor
meetings—personal conversations between corporate managers and
investors they select—to find that Reg. FD should not be expected to
deter selective disclosure. The regulation was disjointed from the
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outset and professional market participants rationally appear to have
taken advantage of its permissive design to obtain preferential access
to inside information. For example, through one recently introduced
service offering, “corporate access,” selected investors spend billions
of dollars on private access to corporate managers in return for the
opportunity to lawfully trade on valuable information before it is
released to the public.
This Article argues that the design of Reg. FD causes undesirable
effects and that the SEC should redraft the regulation to follow the
Supreme Court’s classification of corporate information as firm
property. The SEC could then regulate selective disclosures as
transactions in this property that require public disclosure, similar to
how insiders must report their personal transactions in firm stock. By
increasing transparency to inform investors of selective disclosure
events, concerns recently expressed by the SEC and the Department
of Justice relating to insider trading enforcement could be alleviated
and their requests for Supreme Court intervention in insider trading
law reconsidered.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the consequences if a senior manager of a public firm
selectively discloses valuable non-public information (“NPI”) about the
firm (such as details of its next quarterly report) to curry favor with an
investor who trades on the information and makes a substantial profit?
In theory, they may both be in breach of the insider trading prohibition
and the manager may have violated Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg.
FD”). In practice, however, this Article argues, the development of the
federal common law of insider trading, the flawed design of Reg. FD,
the enforcement policy and practices of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), and the preference and ability of both corporate
managers and investors to keep such selective disclosures out of the
view of the public and the regulator combine to allow such conduct to
occur with impunity. As a result, selective disclosure provides an
attractive method for extraction of private benefits from public firms to
the detriment of investors without preferential access.
As an example of how managers may be able to distribute such
valuable information, consider the recent Second Circuit decision in
United States v. Newman: an investor relations manager at Dell (at the
time, a large public firm) selectively provided non-public information
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about its upcoming quarterly results that earned two investors trading
profits of $62 million. The Second Circuit held that this activity did not
constitute unlawful insider trading and the SEC did not even allege a
Reg. FD violation.1 Yet, the receipt of $62 million worth of information
from a corporate manager would be a meaningful event for any investor
and the potential availability of such awards could sway investors’
decisions on parallel matters where they can influence the manager’s
position—such as when they vote on executive pay or in director
elections.
This Article argues that the current regime, which affords corporate
managers significant discretion over the allocation of corporate
information, requires increased transparency to prevent abuse. As there
is no current comprehensive treatment of the regulation and practices of
private investor meetings, Part I begins by establishing what is publicly
known about these highly private activities and describes the function of
private investor meetings from the perspectives of firms and investors.
Managers of large public firms participate in hundreds of private
meetings per year, more than half of which are with hedge funds. 2
Notably, managers have significant discretion over their firms’
disclosure choices and are often able to choose whether to disclose
information publicly or selectively. This means that managers can
decide whether to make such information a public good or a private
good—a trade-off between increasing informational efficiency in the
market for the firm’s stock and providing their selected recipients with a
valuable trading advantage.
Part II analyzes how federal securities regulation fails to deter
undesirable selective disclosures. First, it examines when selective
disclosure may violate the prohibition on insider trading by “tipping.” In
its still leading 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court held
that selective disclosure of material NPI is not prohibited unless the
insider receives a personal benefit from the disclosure. 3 Without a
personal benefit, neither the insider who discloses valuable information
nor the outsider who trades on it will violate the insider trading
framework. Against this permissive regulatory backdrop, the 1990s saw
1.
2.

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
Steve Johnson, Hedge Funds Have Greater Access, FIN. TIMES (London), June
3, 2013, at 2.
3. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

37

an increasing number of press and research reports documenting how
public firms used selective disclosure of material NPI to curry favor
with selected sell-side financial analysts, which drew the regulator’s
attention to this issue. In considering its options, the SEC decided
against attempting to extend insider trading law to selective disclosures
where the “personal benefit” accrued to the firm instead of to one of its
insiders, as the threat of such litigation would deter corporate
communications. Rather than subsuming such selective disclosures
under the insider trading framework, the SEC opted to introduce Reg.
FD to deter them. So as not to discourage corporate managers from
speaking to investors, however, the SEC drafted Reg. FD as a pure
disclosure obligation, prohibiting intentional private disclosures without
simultaneous disclosure to the market, while explicitly stipulating that
failure to comply with the new regulation would not give rise to antifraud liability under the securities laws.
This Article offers a detailed analysis of Reg. FD, which requires
that when firms intentionally disclose material NPI, they do so through
broad public means and not through private channels. It finds that both
the original design of the regulation and subsequent judicial
developments cause it to fail to restrict many disclosures considered
undesirable and have instead created an apparently unforeseen yet
strong demand for private meetings with corporate managers. There are
several reasons for this: first, as Reg. FD only applies to issuers,
selective disclosure recipients are free to trade immediately after
receiving private information, before other investors receive the
information. Importantly, recipients can trade even if the information is
material under the securities laws and even if the information was
intentionally disclosed selectively to them. Consequently, Reg. FD
cannot curb demand, only supply. Second, the SEC has explicitly
acknowledged that, when managers evaluate whether a piece of
information is material for purposes of establishing if it can be
intentionally disclosed in private, it will apply a more lenient
recklessness standard for disclosures made in unrehearsed private
discussions than for prepared written statements. More disclosures can
therefore be labeled unintentional under Reg. FD if they take place
within private meetings than in other settings, which means that they do
not violate the regulation as long as they are eventually disclosed to the
public—a construction which should increase both supply and demand
for such private conversations. Third, Reg. FD creates a window for
recipients of selectively disclosed material information to trade on it.
This is because issuers are allowed up to twenty-four hours from when

38

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

they become aware of an unintentional private disclosure of material
information to rectify it by publicly disclosing the same information, but
the recipients can trade in the meantime. Fourth, the assessment of
whether information disclosed in a private investor meeting is material
is, as a practical matter, left to the disclosing insider. The regulation
does not create any requirement or mechanism for oversight of the
materiality determination, apart from possible SEC enforcement. This
means that neither intentional nor unintentional disclosures of material
information may ever be corrected and publicly disclosed. Fifth, Reg.
FD does not require issuers to take any action to prevent recipients of
mistaken disclosures of material information from trading. Issuers may
even allow recipients to trade on such information, since they do not
violate Reg. FD as long as they disclose the information to the public
within the stipulated window. Sixth, where an issuer has mistakenly
disclosed material information in private, Reg. FD only requires
disclosure of the information to all investors. The regulation critically
fails to provide any mechanism to inform shareholders or the regulator
that a selective disclosure event has occurred; a design which makes it
impossible to assess how frequently managers disclose material
information in private and whether they repeatedly select the same
beneficiaries for such disclosures. Reg. FD thus fails to curb
opportunistic supply.
The Article continues by reviewing all enforcement actions in
relation to Reg. FD to estimate its deterrent effect. The SEC has taken
action in thirteen cases, of which twelve resulted in negotiated
settlements with low civil penalties, typically paid by the issuers. On the
only occasion the SEC opted for court action over a negotiated
settlement in relation to Reg. FD, its complaint was dismissed—a defeat
which appears to have reduced enforcement activity while
demonstrating that it is difficult to prove materiality in cases of subtle
private disclosures. Furthermore, the SEC enforces Reg. FD so
infrequently and imposes penalties of such a low magnitude that the
regulation is unlikely to deter opportunistic selective disclosure in
practice. In larger firms, managers may be able to confer billions of
dollars’ worth of valuable information on preferred investors while
facing little risk of paying civil penalties, which are low even when
imposed.
The Article then considers whether market participants may have
taken advantage of these incoherencies to develop methods for
profitable information trading that negate the purposes of the Dirks and
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Reg. FD frameworks while superficially complying with them. Dirks’
protection of recipients who do not provide a personal benefit to insiders
was built on the recognition that such selectively disclosed information
at some point would benefit investors at large through improved market
pricing of securities. However, as Dirks does not require that any such
benefit actually materialize in order for the selective disclosure to be
permitted, professional investors increasingly demand information in
private forums and trade on such information in ways that may not
provide benefits to investors other than themselves. Similarly, while
Reg. FD encourages firms that selectively disclose material information
by mistake to publicly disclose it promptly, the SEC failed to recognize
that this construction creates strong incentives among investors to pay
for the necessary access to managers, in order to be the investors who
receive such disclosures first.
The Article illustrates how the SEC’s design and enforcement of
Reg. FD appears to have led to the introduction of a new service
offering—“corporate access”—that formalizes selective disclosure.
Through this service, which has quickly become a billion-dollar
industry, brokers charge professional investors to participate in private
investor meetings with managers of public firms. The Article analyzes
potential problems with corporate access, including the severe conflicts
of interest it creates between firms and their brokers; how managers may
leverage their participation in corporate access events to pressure
brokers into providing favorable research; and how it creates potentially
severe, but hidden, information asymmetries among investors.
Part II ends by noting that the potential deterrent effect on selective
disclosure provided by the insider trading framework may have
diminished following the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Newman. While the appellate courts have historically found it relatively
easy to establish a personal benefit under Dirks, Newman appears to take
a stricter approach in requiring an objective and consequential exchange.
If and where Newman is followed, the insider trading regime will be
unavailable, and therefore, unable to create deterrence in more selective
disclosure scenarios.
Part III analyzes how to better regulate selective disclosure in light
of the Supreme Court’s recognition that a firm’s NPI is its property.
Building on this classification, it establishes that the value of
information as an asset of the firm consists of the ability to transact with
uninformed investors in the market. The Article considers agency
implications that follow from the lack of monitoring, finding that
managers have significant ability to monetize their firms’ information
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assets through selective disclosure without internal or external oversight.
Reviewing the existing evidence of managers’ opportunistic use of
information, it notes how managers use selective disclosure to influence
analysts’ behavior and voluntary public disclosure to maximize their
own option awards and personal trading benefits. The available evidence
on selective disclosure supports the hypothesis that some managers
selectively disclose valuable information to investors they know, who
then trade profitably on such information and reciprocate by voting
against other shareholders’ proposals to limit executive pay.
Against this background, a closer analysis of the disclosure
incentives of managers and investors finds that investors face a
collective action problem when firms choose to provide information
privately. The first manifestation of this problem is that investors who
know that they are able to procure private meetings with senior
corporate managers will prefer that information is selectively, rather
than publicly, disclosed to increase their opportunities for profitable
trading. This means that the group of investors that actually engages
with corporate managers is unlikely to be interested in improving the
quality of public disclosure for the benefit of shareholders as a
collective. A second expression of this collective action problem is that
investors with such private access may in fact prefer less, and less
useful, public disclosure in order to increase their opportunities for
profitable trading on private information. Similarly, managers may
prefer less, and less useful, public disclosure in order to maximize the
value of information under their control and their ability to allocate
information selectively to preferred investors.
Part III ends by contrasting the different methods for deployment of
firm information. To place selective disclosure regulation in context,
other mechanisms by which firms may deploy their NPI to conduct
information-based transactions are examined. The Article proposes a
taxonomy of three private methods for deployment of NPI: insider
trading, firm trading, and selective disclosure followed by recipient
trading, as well as one public method: full disclosure to the market.
Following an analysis of these different options for deployment of
information, the Article argues that selective disclosure is a very
attractive route for managers to monetize information since it is
comparatively lightly regulated. While this may create attractive
opportunities for firms to effectively raise equity by selectively
disclosing NPI to investors who can trade profitably and provide
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reciprocal value to the firm, it also leaves firms vulnerable to managerial
opportunism.
Part IV starts by proposing the obvious improvement to the current
Reg. FD: firms that have selectively disclosed material NPI by mistake
should be required to file a Form 8-K to inform investors about the
mistake. From an oversight and deterrence perspective, investors at
large need to be informed when firms make such serious mistakes, as
these could result in the redistribution of large amounts of money to
investors selected by corporate managers. It is also proposed that firms
provide a narrative in their proxy statements, detailing the purposes and
frequency of their private investor interactions to allow investors to
assess how individual firms actually use NPI as property.
While this proposal would bring Reg. FD closer to what the SEC
appears to have intended, there are several reasons why issuers still may
not provide shareholders with enough information about selective
disclosures to allow them to monitor effectively: managers may apply a
materiality threshold that is too high and thus fail to inform the market
of disclosures; there will be transactions in information that, while not
material, is still valuable; and managers may opportunistically avoid
disclosing Reg. FD events due to the low probability of enforcement. As
these concerns cannot be effectively addressed within the current
structure of Reg. FD, Part IV proceeds to argue that the SEC should
recognize that its regulation is unnecessarily disjointed from the
Supreme Court’s classification of information as firm property and
embrace the Court’s approach to instead regulate selective disclosure as
a transaction in such property. As selective disclosure transactions
resemble equity raisings with a significant risk of conflicted managerial
interest, a transaction reporting requirement should be introduced so that
firms are required to publicly report all selective disclosure events as
transactions. Under the new framework, firms would not be required to
disclose the actual information that is the subject of private investor
meetings but would have to provide general details about these private
interactions, such as their dates, times, and counterparties. Such
reporting would provide investors at large the opportunity to assess
managers’ use of valuable firm information and the risk of conflicted
managerial interest.
The new framework would deter behavior that shareholders find
undesirable while rewarding beneficial transactions in information.
Similar to the requirement that insiders report their own trading in their
firms’ stock, the reporting of selective disclosure events would better
enable investors and the SEC to assess the likelihood that an insider is
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using corporate information for personal gain. Enforcement of
undesirable selective disclosure would thus be easier. This new
approach would also have other beneficial effects. First, shifting the
enforcement focus to transactions enables the SEC to verify that firms
disclose their transactions accurately by requiring the typical
counterparties to these transactions—professional investors and
analysts—to also keep records of meetings, with penalties imposed for
failures to do so. By enlisting the other party to these transactions,
enforcement is more likely to be effective. Second, it allows for a new
approach where firms are made answerable for their information
transactions to their own shareholders.
The idea is simple: investors cannot be deceived if firms are fully
transparent about their selective disclosure transactions, and with full
transparency the SEC can shift its focus from undertaking complicated
and expensive investigations into the details of private conversations,
which at best result in miniscule penalties unlikely to produce
deterrence, to ensuring that firms provide complete reporting of their
selective disclosure transactions. This new framework could also
improve the allocation of analyst resources, as it will be easier for them
to find firms that are undersupplied by information traders. Importantly,
the new framework would not curtail legitimate disclosure activities or
require disclosure of the potentially sensitive details of private
discussions, and would consequently not dissuade investors from taking
part in private investor meetings. Investors would still be able to receive
and trade on material NPI; the main difference is that other investors
would be made aware of the extent of such activities in individual firms
after the fact.
The Article ends by considering systemic implications of the
regulation of private investor meetings. By definition, only active
investors take part in private discussions with corporate managers, and
they require private information in order to outperform passive
investment options over time to justify their fees. Active investors may
consequently prefer private disclosures and may find it worthwhile to
compensate obliging managers via the firm. Without oversight
mechanisms, such as the new reporting obligation proposed herein, there
is a significant risk that selective disclosure of valuable information
becomes a widespread phenomenon that systematically reallocates value
from investors at large to active investors selected by corporate
managers. A regulatory response is therefore required in order to
prevent unnecessarily inflated amounts of resources being spent on
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providing, procuring, and monetizing private information exchanges
between corporate managers and the investors they select.
I. OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS
A. REGULATORY BACKGROUND: DISCLOSURE AND DISCRETION
Managers of public firms have broad discretion in deciding which
investors to meet with, 4 the forums in which to meet them, and how
much information to provide about the firm. On a day-to-day basis,5 the
limits of what managers may disclose in private meetings are defined by
two sets of SEC rules: Form 8-K,6 which mandates public disclosure of
certain significant events listed therein, and Reg. FD,7 which provides
4. While this Article tends to use the term “meetings,” any form of personal
private communication (such as phone calls) will, of course, have the same effect.
Similarly, as noted in Section II.D.1, infra, the line between analysts and investors is
increasingly porous so references herein to “investors” should be considered in a broad
sense to include parties seeking NPI from the firm to improve the accuracy of their
valuation of the firm’s stock, whether for their own or their clients’ trading. As for
references herein to “managers,” think of a CEO or a CFO, as they are the most popular
insiders to speak to.
Furthermore, investors taking part in a private meeting are ex ante receiving time with
management and may not know what, if any, specific information they will receive.
However, it is inevitable that an investor will receive some information, even if it is
only an assessment of managers’ confidence or composure in answering the investor’s
questions. See, e.g., Serena Ng & Anton Troianovski, Investors Prize Face Time with
Bosses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2015, at A1 (describing private meetings where
managers’ tone, confidence, and refusal to elaborate on certain issues gave participating
analysts and investors clues for profitable trading). This Article thus regards private
investor meetings to contain some element of selective disclosure, since participating
investors will receive NPI, while acknowledging that this NPI will be non-material in
many cases.
5. That is to say, disregarding periodic financial reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q),
which must include all material information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20; see also 15
U.S.C. § 7241 (2012).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2015). Such disclosure has to occur within four business
days.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–103 (2015). The SEC proposed Reg. FD in 1999, see
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg.
72,590 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Proposing Release], and adopted a revised
version after a comment process, see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment
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that disclosure of material 8 NPI 9 to certain recipients 10 shall also be
publicly disclosed at least simultaneously (in the case of intentional11
selective disclosure) or promptly 12 (in the case of non-intentional
selective disclosure).
Managers can consequently disclose information not covered by
these regulatory frameworks on a voluntary basis. This means that
managers in deciding whether, and if so, when and to whom to disclose
such information are guided primarily by their fiduciary duties.
However, fiduciary duties in state corporate law are not useful in
addressing managers’ opportunistic use of their discretion over their

Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000), codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 243.100–103 (2015) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
8. The materiality concept is discussed further below. See infra text
accompanying notes 20–25.
9. Information is deemed non-public under the securities laws if it has not been
disclosed in a manner that ensures its availability to the investing public and “without
favoring any special person or group.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.12 (1983)
(quoting Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 45 S.E.C. 249 (May 25
1973). Information can, however, be deemed public if enough people have access to it
so that it is nonetheless impounded into the stock price. United States v. Libera, 989
F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
10. While the Proposing Release, supra note 7, covered disclosure to any person
outside the issuer, the Adopting Release, supra note 7, was narrowed to only cover
disclosure to certain recipients which include “securities market professionals [such as
broker-dealers and investment managers] and to holders of the issuer’s securities under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the security holder will trade on
the basis of the information.”
11. Reg. FD states that “selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is
‘intentional’ when the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not
knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and
nonpublic.” 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2015).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2015) defines “promptly” to mean:
as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of
twenty-four hours or the commencement of the next day’s trading on
the New York Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer . .
. learns that there has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer
or person acting on behalf of the issuer of information that the senior
official knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material and
non-public.

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

45

firms’ NPI due to a lack of transparency,13 the protection afforded them
by the business judgment rule,14 and enforcement obstacles.15
As opportunistic use of NPI about a public firm materializes in the
monetization of that information in the stock market, this lack of state
law tools has functionally been bridged by the imposition of a federal
duty of loyalty in the insider trading framework. The most important
development of this duty for present purposes was the Supreme Court
decision in Dirks v. SEC, which established that insiders breach their
duty by disclosing information to an outsider only if they get a personal
benefit in doing so.16 In the absence of a personal benefit, there is no
breach of the duty of loyalty, and no insider trading liability will arise
for the insider tipper or the outsider tippee. The Dirks decision, and the
Supreme Court’s declaration in United States v. O’Hagan that a firm’s
confidential information was its property, 17 caused some managers to
establish disclosure practices to monetize the firm’s NPI for the benefit
of the firm. The SEC considered this development undesirable as it
occasionally created severe information asymmetries among investors.
As a result, it adopted Reg. FD in 2000 with the intent to prohibit
intentional selective disclosure of material information.18
There are, accordingly, two different concepts and purposes
involved in selective disclosure regulation. In the insider trading
13. This lack of transparency is the topic of this Article. For analyses of why
transparency is necessary to enforce duties, see Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure
and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 118-20 (1999)
(explaining that disclosure obligations are necessary to ensure that managers abide by
their fiduciary duties under corporate law, since managers would not be expected to
voluntarily provide information that could signal a duty breach) and Reinier Kraakman,
Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Overview Essay, in REFORMING COMPANY
AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 95 (G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds., 2004).
14. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 171 (2002) (“It
is not easy to separate out deliberate deception from optimistic bias, which may make
courts reluctant to police this area under the rubric of fiduciary responsibility.”).
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1623–24
(1999) (arguing that the police powers of the SEC make it a more efficient enforcer of
insider trading laws than private shareholders; an argument that appears equally
convincing for selective disclosure).
16. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
17. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
18. See infra Section II.B.
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context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the idea that the
informational playing field among investors in public firms does not
need to be level, which means that managers may provide selected
investors with better quality information than others.19 This is due to the
grounding of the insider trading rules in the anti-fraud framework. The
SEC then overlaid this principle with Reg. FD in order to reduce the
resulting information asymmetries and maintain public confidence in the
fairness of securities markets.
One key type of information that managers may disclose on a
discretionary basis is NPI that is not deemed material.20 Information is
material under the securities laws if it would be “viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available” about the firm.21 Whether a particular piece
of information is material needs to be determined through an inquiry of
the facts in each individual case. For present purposes, the most
important aspect of materiality is that this concept is not synchronous
with information having some relevance to the valuation of a firm (and
thus its stock); since it is an explicit part of the materiality test that the
particular information needs to have significantly altered the total mix of
information available, information with low value-relevance will not be
deemed material. There is thus a judicially recognized gray zone in
which information is value-relevant without reaching the threshold of
materiality. In this zone, corporate managers can lawfully disclose

19. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (holding that the
standard of materiality is not automatically reached simply because insiders or a
“favored few” profited from trading on the information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
661–62 (1983) (“All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not
inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders.”); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity under § 10(b)”).
20. This is a slight but for present purposes inconsequential simplification as Form
8-K does require certain events to be disclosed regardless of materiality, such as the
resignation of a director.
21. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1970). This test was
adopted for 10b-5 purposes in Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. In promulgating Reg. FD, the
SEC also preferred to use this concept over establishing another test or list of items to
be considered material. See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,721.

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

47

valuable information to investors they select themselves without concern
for insider trading rules or Reg. FD.22
As materiality needs to be assessed by a “probability/magnitude”
approach, 23 so-called “soft” information (such as the firm’s own
forecasts) may also be so unreliable that it will not be considered
material as a matter of law.24 Furthermore, as materiality is determined
by reference to the information available to the public, professional
investors or analysts may lawfully combine selectively disclosed nonmaterial NPI from a firm with their own private information to create
material information under the so-called “mosaic theory” and use it for
profitable trading without committing fraud under the securities laws.25
The concept of selective disclosure thus covers two very different
activities. The first is where investors or analysts exercise skill in
knowing which questions to ask managers, and elicit answers that,
combined with their prior knowledge of the firm, produce value-relevant
22. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
801, 809 (2014) (arguing that “insiders can profit legally by trading on many types of
valuable, ‘sub-material’ information”); Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider
Trading Regulation in the United States, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING—LAW AND
PRACTICE 39, 48 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991) (describing how
insiders can lawfully conduct profitable trading); Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady,
Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1319, 1335 (1999) (“Materiality is a fluid concept: [i]nsiders at almost all times have
the advantage of superior insight and a sense of which way things are going even if they
do not possess a fact that a court would call material and nonpublic.”); see also ROBERT
C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 507–08 (1986) (“A successful 10b-5 suit presupposes the
insider had access to definite bits of information of fairly obvious importance. He
knows of an ore discovery, a forthcoming merger, the disastrous results of the current
quarter, a new product, or some other discrete chunk of nonpublic news. . . . [I]nsiders
occasionally have insight into their companies’ futures that is better than the market’s
because of continual exposure to numerous bits and pieces of information and opinion
that come their way by virtue of their being in their official positions and that have
value as a totality. This total picture is based in part on numerous small items that,
individually considered, are not important enough to be labelled material . . .”).
23. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 238–39.
24. See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 125–31 (3rd
ed. 2010) (summarizing case law which illustrates that soft information will often, but
not always, fail to reach the materiality threshold).
25. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977). The SEC endorsed the mosaic
theory in promulgating Reg. FD while recognizing that financial analysts can provide
an important function in reviewing corporate disclosures for value-relevant information.
See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722.
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information. Here, recipients of information build mosaics and receive
the property right to use them for trading in the stock market. This is a
valuable activity in the equity markets, allowing analysts to monitor
firms incentivized by profitable trading. The second type is where the
manager delivers information that is independently valuable or material.
In these cases, any professional investor would be able to realize that the
information can be used for profitable trading without additional work.
This is what appears to have taken place in Newman,26 where certain
investors received advance notice of details in an upcoming quarterly
report. This second type is the focus of this Article and can in turn be
divided into two categories: a) an award of information for reciprocal
value only to the firm, and b) an award that includes some benefits to
the manager herself. As investors may consider selective disclosure
events where the manager gets personal benefits or where the firm does
not receive adequate compensation for its information undesirable,
mechanisms for oversight over the second type of selective disclosure
may be useful. However, as the difference between the two types of
selective disclosure depends on the value-relevance of the information
disclosed, the SEC faces obvious challenges in distinguishing examples
of skillful mosaic construction from cases where selected investors are
simply handed material information in private discussions.
B. DETAILS OF PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS
As the practices of private investor meetings do not appear to have
been analyzed in the legal literature,27 this section describes the general
attributes of such meetings by drawing on academic research in adjacent
disciplines such as accounting and finance, and presents details of

26. The Second Circuit recognized in Newman that Dell used selective disclosure
to build relationships with investors, and this fact contributed to its finding that the
defendants could not be expected to infer an improper motive for such information
being privately available to them. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454–55 (2d
Cir. 2014).
27. The topic has generally not been analyzed much in the literature, likely because
“informal contact between institutional investors and firms is by its nature private and
difficult to quantify.” Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of
Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939, 942 (2010). Some recent
financial research on the topic is presented at the end of this subsection.
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meeting and disclosure practices as described in investor relations
publications and the financial press.
Private meetings or discussions between senior corporate managers
and investors or analysts are generally referred to as an “investor
relations” activity. The National Investor Relations Institute (“NIRI”)28
defines investor relations as “a strategic management responsibility that
integrates finance, communication, marketing and securities law
compliance to enable the most effective two-way communication
between a company, the financial community, and other constituencies,
which ultimately contributes to a company’s securities achieving fair
valuation.” 29 More simply, investor relations is described by industry
literature as a corporate function for marketing the firm’s stock.30
Analysts and active investors consistently rank private
conversations with management as their preferred channel for sourcing
information. 31 Firms equally regard private meetings as the most
28. Founded in 1969, NIRI characterizes itself as “the professional association of
corporate officers and investor relations consultants responsible for communication
among corporate management, shareholders, securities analysts and other financial
community constituents.” It presents itself as “[t]he largest professional investor
relations association in the world, . . . [with] more than 3,300 members represent[ing]
over 1,600 publicly held companies and $9 trillion in stock market capitalization.” See
About NIRI, NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., http://www.niri.org/FunctionalMenu/About
.aspx [https://perma.cc/94BQ-45X7]. NIRI has issued voluntary standards of practice
relating to disclosure, conducts surveys on investor relations practices, and publishes
the monthly magazine “IR Update,” all cited herein.
29. NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.nir
i.org/about-niri/annual-report [https://perma.cc/SM9K-6FVP][hereinafter NIRI 2014
ANNUAL REPORT].
30. BRUCE W. MARCUS, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL – INVESTOR RELATIONS IN A
DYNAMIC WORLD 12 (2005) (arguing that the role of investor relations is to convince
investors that the firm’s stock will be a better investment than other alternatives). See
ANNE GUIMARD, INVESTOR RELATIONS – PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL BEST
PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL COMMUNICATIONS 190 (2d ed. 2013) for a description of
investor relations as a marketing function. Guimard was a NIRI board member as of its
latest annual report. See NIRI 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29.
31. In 1977, securities analysts regarded personal conversations with managers as
the most valuable source of information. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 67–68
(1977). This still appears to be the case. See Lawrence D. Brown et al., Inside the
“Black Box” of Sell-Side Financial Analysts, 53 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 10–13 (2015) (finding
that sell-side analysts find communication with management more useful than their own
research or firms’ public reporting); Lawrence D. Brown, Andrew C. Call, Michael B.
Clement & Nathan Y. Sharp, The Activities of Buy-Side Analysts and the Determinants
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important communication channel with investors. 32 Private investor
meetings are now so common that many professional investors require a
meeting with the CEO before initiating a new investment,33 and some
investors decline to take part in meetings with firms unless they are on a
“one-on-one” basis with senior management. 34 North American firms
average 153 one-on-one investor meetings per year, with a senior
manager taking part in 90 of them. 35 Naturally, there may be large
discrepancies in meeting practices between firms depending on their
individual circumstances and the policies their managers decide to
adopt. For example, one well-known CEO reportedly avoids private
investor meetings entirely to ensure that new information reaches all
investors simultaneously,36 while another CEO has estimated that such
meetings take up 25% to 30% of his time.37 General Electric participates
in approximately 400 analyst and investor meetings annually, 70 of
which are with senior managers.38 The data presented here only covers

of Their Stock Recommendations, 62 J. ACCT. & ECON. 139, 147 (2016) (finding that
buy-side analysts find sell-side analysts’ provision of access to management more
useful than their written reports, earnings forecasts or stock recommendations); see also
GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 161 (arguing that one-on-one meetings are the preferred
way of investor communication for both issuers and investors and labeling the practice
“irreplaceable”).
32. GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 161; NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., ANALYST
SPONSORED INVESTOR CONFERENCES SURVEY, 2013 REPORT, 14 (Jan. 10, 2014) (finding
that “one-on-ones were the most valuable element of an analyst sponsored investor
conference”).
33. Leslie Kwoh, Investors Demand CEO Face Time, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2012.
One investor has stated that he would typically have two or three such meetings before
“even contemplat[ing] an investment.” For further examples, see Alex Jolliffe,
Corporate Access: The Investor View, IR MAG., SUPPLEMENT: CORPORATE ACCESS:
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS, June 2012, at 12, and Ng & Troianovski, supra note 4.
34. GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 160.
35. IR Events and Meetings, IR MAG., Spring 2015, at 39 (presenting data by size
of firms, showing that larger firms take part in more meetings; e.g., the largest firms
take part in an average of 253 meetings per year, of which 116 are with a senior
manager).
36. Richard Blackden, Warren Buffett Tackles Tricky Issue of Succession, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 6, 2012, at 5. See Ng & Troianovski, supra note 4, for
another example of a public firm that does not participate in private meetings.
37. Kwoh, supra note 33.
38. Ng & Troianovski, supra note 4.
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physical meetings, however, so the figures would be higher if telephone
calls, which may be similar in content and purpose, were included.39
Recent empirical studies indicate that private access to management
can be valuable. Investors with access to invitation-only investor
conferences that provide private meetings can earn significant trading
profits through regular attendance.40 In a similar vein, brokers who host
investor conferences have been found to issue more accurate earnings
forecasts on participating firms than non-hosting brokers (who are
typically not invited), and their recommendations generate abnormal
returns, indicating that greater access to management is a contributing
factor to an analyst’s informational advantage. 41 An analysis of all
private meetings between senior management and investors of a NYSElisted firm found that hedge funds with access to such meetings made
more informed trading decisions.42 As these studies review the actions
of investment professionals, they should be interpreted carefully without
inferring that anyone given access to management could conduct
profitable trades. These studies do, however, indicate that NPI can be
used for profitable trading by professional investors with access to
private events.
Interestingly, more than half of US firms’ investor meetings are
with hedge funds, even though they hold only 6% of the equity market.43
39. It is very difficult to establish the amount of private interactions firms have
with analysts and investors. Soltes reviewed records of all interactions between one
large-cap NYSE-traded firm and sell-side analysts over a year, and found that only 21%
of interactions were publicly observable, for example, where the firm’s participation in
investor conferences was disclosed. See Eugene Soltes, Private Interaction Between
Firm Management and Sell-Side Analysts, 52 J. ACCT. RES. 245, 247 (2014).
40. Brian J. Bushee, Michael J. Jung & Gregory S. Miller, Do Investors Benefit
from Selective Access to Management? 33 (Wharton School, Working Paper, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880149 [https://perma.cc/BFT4-NY49] (finding that informed
trading increased during private meetings held as part of investor conferences, and such
trading could earn investors a three-day trading profit of 0.4%-0.6% per conference).
41. T. Clifton Green, Russell Jame, Stanimir Markov & Musa Subasi, Access to
Management and the Informativeness of Analyst Research, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 239
(2014).
42. David Solomon & Eugene Soltes, What Are We Meeting For? The
Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors, 58 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2015) (noting
that their results, which indicate that hedge funds conduct more profitable trades than
other investors who meet privately with management, could support both a theory that
they are better at interpreting information and a theory that they are receiving different
information).
43. Johnson, supra note 2.
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For example, the records of the NYSE-listed firm mentioned above
showed that the four investors it had the most private meetings with
were all hedge funds, and the most active hedge fund met the firm once
per quarter, on average. 44 The prevalence of hedge funds as meeting
participants and their ability to make more profitable trades following
private meetings than other investors 45 raise questions of how firms
choose investors for selective disclosure and why private meetings are a
worthwhile activity. Put differently, when Dell disclosed information
worth $62 million to selected investors,46 what did it get in return? This
will be explored next.
C. THE FUNCTION OF PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS
1. From the Perspective of Firms
NIRI describes the importance of private investor meetings as
follows, which emphasizes that the focus of such meetings is to provide
investors with information they cannot otherwise obtain:
One-on-one meetings with individuals or groups are a common and
indispensable way to disseminate information about a company and
to answer legitimate requests for a discussion of long-term strategies,
as well as to provide detailed information. One-on-one meetings help
to increase transparency, build goodwill, and make a company more
47
approachable in the eyes of the investment community.

This description succinctly illustrates that firms may use selective
disclosure of new information as a unique disclosure method in order to
bond with investors. Other benefits of private meetings presented in the
investor relations literature similarly allude to the use of NPI as a
corporate resource. Private meetings may be used to convince investors

44. Solomon & Soltes, supra note 42, at 335–36 (finding that the investor that met
most frequently with the firm took part in twenty-two meetings during a time period
covering twenty-two quarters).
45. Id. at 349–50.
46. See Section II.E, infra, for a further discussion of this case, which was briefly
outlined on pp. 35-36.
47. NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR INVESTOR
RELATIONS – DISCLOSURE 53 (2014).
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to buy the firm’s stock.48 They may also help build shareholder loyalty
to increase the likelihood of participation in future securities offerings,
assistance if the firm encounters a crisis, or support for potential future
strategic shifts or large acquisitions. 49 Such meetings also allow for
investor feedback and may provide an informal venue for managers to
test ideas.50 Reasons for conducting private meetings particularly with
hedge funds may include generating greater liquidity, 51 increasing
volatility, and decreasing uncertainty associated with market rumors.52
In general, firm benefits of private meetings appear to be provided
in the form of intangible value that is difficult to quantify.
2. From the Perspective of Participating Investors
A main function of private meetings with senior management is, of
course, to enable investors and analysts to find value-relevant NPI that
can be used for profitable trading. Perceived advantages to investors of
private meetings compared to other disclosure methods include the
opportunity to ask more searching questions and receive more detailed
48. GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 97 (explaining that it is important to have investors
willing to buy stock when existing shareholders sell); id. at 165 (suggesting that
“[d]ecisions about whether to send the CEO or IRO to meet with a portfolio manager
should be based . . . on the likelihood that the meeting will lead to the purchase of stock
in the company”); see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 455 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“[The Head of Investor Relations at Dell] selectively disclosed confidential quarterly
financial information . . . to establish relationships with financial firms who might be in
a position to buy Dell’s stock.”); MARCUS, supra note 30, at 91 (arguing that the
purpose of private meetings is to increase investors’ understanding of the firm and
convince them to buy the firm’s stock).
49. GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 162 (stating the importance of regular meetings
with investors); id. at 181 (stating that “[f]aithful shareholders are more likely to
participate in a capital increase . . . or to help withstand a crisis”); MARCUS, supra note
30, at 107 (noting that some investors are willing to “provide some support in difficult
times”); Kwoh, supra note 33 (quoting a CEO describing the purpose of private
meetings as “selling the management team” and showing accountability).
50. MARCUS, supra note 30, at 107.
51. One representative of a hedge fund argued that issuers should participate in
private meetings with hedge funds since they provide liquidity. See Matt Brusch, What
Investors Want from IROs, IR UPDATE, Oct. 2010, at 18.
52. GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 102 (suggesting “[h]igher volatility” and
“remov[ing] uncertainty in the stock conveyed by market rumors” as reasons for
meeting with hedge funds, but not explaining why increased volatility would be
beneficial or why private meetings may be a preferable method for managing rumors).
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answers than would otherwise be possible, as well as the opportunity to
challenge managers more than would be appropriate in a public forum.53
Analysts use meetings to verify facts, find new information, and
familiarize themselves with corporate managers.54 Topics of discussion
are often forward-looking and include industry competition and the
managers’ strategy. 55 Analysts also attempt to confirm their earnings
projections, for example, by gaining management’s feedback on whether
their forecasts are “in the ball park.”56
Functionally, investors can engage in three conceptually distinct
types of activities to reduce uncertainty about the pricing of a security:
they can seek to acquire new information, verify already available
information, or analyze available information. 57 Investors use private
meetings with management to reduce uncertainty about securities
pricing by asking questions both to acquire new information and to
verify existing information. Acquisition of new information could
consist of asking for more details on items that already have been
subject to some disclosure58 or, as in Newman, attempting to learn of
information in advance of its imminent public disclosure.59 Verification
of information could consist of attempts to have management confirm
whether previous forward-looking statements are still valid because such
53. See GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 162 (suggesting that corporate managers
meeting with hedge fund managers may have an experience similar to “being held in
custody in an interrogation room”); MARCUS, supra note 30, at 107–08 (noting that
professional portfolio managers have an urgent and intensive demand for substantial
information and ask highly technical questions); Kwoh, supra note 33 (quoting a CEO
of a public firm who notes that “investors probe him for confidential information . . .
‘all the time’”).
54. MARCUS, supra note 30, at 96.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 106. For a real-world example, see United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438, 454–55 (2d Cir. 2014), where investor relations personnel provided testimony that
analysts regularly received information from firms “in order to check assumptions in
their models in advance of earnings announcements” and the investor relations
departments in question “routinely ‘leaked’ earnings data in advance of quarterly
earnings.”
57. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 564–65 (1984).
58. For example, in Soltes, supra note 39, at 257, 43% of all analyst interactions
occurred within seventy-two hours of public news releases by the firm.
59. Newman, 773 F.3d at 454–55.
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information would be more reliable if confirmed by a person with the
ability to influence it.
The costs associated with undertaking each of these activities will
determine the availability of the information resulting from them. 60
Information costs of private investor meetings may include
compensating intermediaries who arrange conferences and salaries for
professional analysts who know the most valuable questions to ask
corporate managers and have the skill to analyze their answers. These
costs are consequently relatively high, meaning that comparatively few
investors will take part in private investor meetings and have access to
such information. Verification of information relating to a firm without
its cooperation is expensive, however, so procuring a private meeting
with management may still be the most cost-effective method of doing
so. 61 Furthermore, acquiring new information directly from senior
managers may remove the need for further verification as they are often
the best possible source.
Not all investors are interested in acquiring NPI. Liquidity traders
buy or sell stocks depending on whether they have a surplus or shortage
of liquid funds for consumption without conducting any research, and
passive investors may invest in funds that simply track an index and
charge minimal management fees. Investors who demand NPI are
sometimes referred to as “information traders”62 or “active investors,” a
group which includes mutual funds and hedge funds.63 These investors
believe that they can outperform a passive index investment by investing
based on their own information collection and analysis, and that the
returns from their superior skill will outweigh the costs of this activity.
They attend private meetings to unearth information, to refine their
estimated intrinsic value of a security, and trade when their estimation
varies from the market price. The investment performance of active
60. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 594-95 (describing the different types of
information costs).
61. This could involve paying an intermediary for arranging a meeting via
“corporate access.” See infra Section I.D.
62. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986) (contrasting different
types of traders).
63. “Buy-side” institutions such as mutual funds and hedge funds employ their
own financial analysts. They may also receive information from “sell-side” financial
analysts employed by brokers. “Active investors” is an umbrella term and only a subset
of such investors seek to acquire NPI in private investor meetings—it is that subset
which this Article references with the term.
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investors is typically evaluated against a benchmark. Active investors
demand NPI—and therefore, private meetings with corporate
managers—as it helps them outperform such benchmarks.
To deduce the appropriate price of a security, an active investor
must estimate many variables. For example, the discounted cash flow
model commonly used for equity valuation forecasts a firm’s future cash
flows by applying growth and profitability estimates (soft information)
to its historical accounting figures (hard information). Factors relating to
the firm, its industry, and the economy all need to be considered to
forecast revenue growth for the firm’s products or divisions, and costs
need to be estimated to determine how future revenue will translate into
profitability. The financing structure must also be projected to estimate
the residual cash flows available to shareholders.
All forward-looking data points in a valuation model are estimates
and therefore subject to uncertainty. Given the uncertainty that
surrounds many of the required inputs to equity valuation, we can
portray an active investor’s expectation of the price of an individual
share that will prevail at some date in the future (and, thereby, the
potential return on investment) as a probability distribution. The
dispersion around the mean expected share price will reflect the risk the
investor attributes to the expected return on the firm’s shares as a result
of the uncertainties in the valuation inputs.64 We can further think of
value-relevant information as data that has the ability to change the
return distribution.65 Production, purchase, or discovery of new hard or
soft information can consequently change an investor’s share price
probability distribution.
By reducing uncertainty about valuation estimates, investors can
refine their assessments of the risk-return profile of a security. If an
investor acquires information that reduces “upside risk” (or the
probability of a positive deviation from the mean), the expected value
becomes lower and the investor may be more inclined to sell the
security. If the acquired information instead reduces “downside risk,”
64. Risk is used in this context as a measure not only of downside deviations from
the expected mean, but also upside deviations. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J.
MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 129 (10th ed. 2014).
65. This depiction of information is inspired by Jack Hirshleifer, Where Are We in
the Theory of Information?, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 31 (1973). See also Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 57, at 561.
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the expected value increases and the investor may be more disposed to
buy the security. If risk is reduced symmetrically (equally on the
downside and the upside, with the same mean after the information
acquisition), the investment offers more return per unit of risk, which
will make it more attractive.66 Thus, any change in the risk profile of a
security can have value to active investors, and new information about a
security will have value if it changes the risk profile.
3. From the Perspective of Non-Participating Investors
Investors who do not participate in private meetings may still
benefit from them. If they are shareholders, they can share in the
benefits accruing to the firm as set out in Section I.C.1. There are two
further potential benefits that may lie more on the shareholder level than
on the firm level: increased market efficiency and improved monitoring
of management. 67 These two factors were recognized as beneficial in
Dirks where the Supreme Court acknowledged that financial analysts
who meet privately with management to question them may “ferret out”
information for the benefit of all investors.68
a. Market Efficiency Benefits?
A security is typically described as trading in an efficient capital
market if the price of the security always reflects all available
information. 69 Efficiency is usually considered in relation to three
different types of information. Developed equity markets are generally
considered to be efficient in relation to two such types: historical price
information (weak form efficiency) and other publicly available
66. Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, Information and Capital Markets, 44 J.
BUS. 289, 290 (1971). Of course, for an optimally diversified investor a reduction in the
idiosyncratic risk of one security which she already holds may not be of value, but for
an active investor attending a private meeting with management in order to decide
whether to take or change a position in a security, such a reduction of risk could be of
interest.
67. These benefits were not noted in the investor relations literature in Section
I.C.1, supra, so they do not appear to be the focus of firms themselves.
68. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983) (quoting Dirks, Exchange Act
Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, at *6 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
69. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
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information (semi-strong efficiency). As these types of information will
be instantly incorporated into prices, they do not offer opportunities for
profitable trading. 70 Markets do not, however, typically impound
information available only to a small number of people into prices (that
is to say, markets do not exhibit strong form efficiency), meaning that
such information may offer profitable trading opportunities. 71 The
absence of strong form efficiency thus provides an initial explanation for
professional investors’ demand for NPI.
In considering the market efficiency requirement that prices fully
reflect “available” information, Gilson and Kraakman noted how the
three levels of market efficiency relate to different information sets that
become reflected in the price following distinct processes.72 Arranging
the three levels on a continuum from weak to strong market efficiency,
they argued that market efficiency should be viewed as a relative
concept, with relative efficiency as a measure of how quickly prices
reflect new information.73 Relative efficiency then increases as the group
of initial recipients of information becomes broader.74 If information is
initially distributed broadly, it will be expected to be reflected in price
quickly and the market will exhibit high relative efficiency with regards
to that information. Conversely, if information is initially distributed to
only a few recipients, it will be expected to take longer to become
reflected in price and the market would therefore be described as having
lower relative efficiency in respect of such information. While this
applies to all relevant information about a security, the focus here is on
disclosures by firms themselves.
Non-mandated disclosures take many different forms. Examples of
methods in which firms disclose information to investors include oneon-one meetings and private telephone conversations, small-group
meetings with investors, non-public roadshow presentations, analyst and

70. Id.; Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1607
(1991).
71. Fama, supra note 69, at 409-13.
72. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 558–60.
73. Id. at 560.
74. While such a continuum of information distribution makes intuitive sense, a
“market may be efficient [with regards to a piece of information] if ‘sufficient numbers’
of investors have ready access” to it. See Fama, supra note 69, at 388; Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 57, at 569.
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investor days, and press releases.75 If we apply the concept of relative
efficiency to illustrative corporate disclosure methods, we may represent
it along the lines of Figure 1.

Figure 1. Relative Efficiency of Different Corporate Disclosure Methods

While Figure 1 should not be viewed as a quantitative
representation of how prices adapt to new information disclosed via
different methods, the qualitative intuition should be broadly correct.
Information selectively disclosed to one investor will take longer to
become reflected in price than broadly disseminated information since
investors with private information seek to maximize their personal gain.
Knowing that other traders are able to observe their trading activity,
traders with selectively disclosed information will attempt to make
decoding as difficult as possible by trading slowly in order to conceal
their informational advantage and disguise themselves as liquidity
traders. 76 The more successfully such information recipients convince
other traders that they are uninformed, the larger their potential profit

75. A useful overview of how firms interact with investors via these (and other)
methods from the perspective of an investor relations professional is presented in
GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 143–87.
76. XAVIER VIVES, INFORMATION AND LEARNING IN MARKETS 339–47 (2008).
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will be and the less information will be impounded into the price of the
security.
Without cooperation from the selective disclosure recipient, other
investors must resort to the less efficient processes of “price decoding”
or “trade decoding” to attempt to decipher the value of the recipient’s
NPI. 77 However, neither type of decoding informs the outsider as to
whether the observed trading is based on new information (such as NPI
from the issuer), mistaken belief, or for liquidity reasons. It is therefore
unlikely that decoding would offer many, if any, opportunities for
market participants to learn of information disclosed to an investor in a
private meeting.78 Research confirms that when information traders are
able to choose when and how to trade, they can prevent decoding.79
The difficulty in decoding does not mean that informed trading will
never have any impact on share prices. Factors affecting the
incorporation of information into prices may be sketched out by
considering an individual investor’s preferences in a practical case.
Consider a stylized version of Newman,80 where one or more investors
receive advance information about the contents of a firm’s quarterly
report.81 From the perspective of an investor, we can outline five factors
that will influence how she chooses to trade and consequently the extent
to which prices will reflect the information.
77. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 573. “Trade decoding occurs whenever
uninformed traders glean trading information by directly observing the transactions of
informed traders,” for instance, by studying transactions subject to reporting
requirements. Id. Price decoding occurs when an outsider observes a price change and
concludes that another trader in the market possesses new information. Id.
78. For early statements to this effect, see id. at 572–79, 629–34, and Donald C.
Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023,
1038 (1990).
79. See, e.g., Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Do Prices Reveal the
Presence of Informed Trading?, 70 J. FIN. 1555 (2015) (finding that “when informed
traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may
fail to capture the presence of informed trading”); see also Lauren Cohen, Christopher
Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski, Decoding Inside Information, 67 J. FIN. 1009 (2012)
(insider trades not decoded until publicized).
80. See generally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
81. “[I]llegal trading usually concerns ‘bombshell’ information that companies are
forced to disclose publicly in the near term.” WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN
& GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 681 (4th ed. 2012).
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First, as already determined, the size of the group of initial
recipients will matter. If several traders have the same information (for
instance, by attending the same conference presentation), the
information may be impounded into prices more quickly than if only
one investor receives it. This results because the recipients may not be
able to coordinate and instead have to compete to capture the gains.82
Second, the amount of time before the quarterly report becomes public
is important. If the recipient has a week to trade, she can trade more
slowly, whereas if the information will become public in a few hours,
the recipient may opt for a more aggressive strategy that results in more
information leakage.83 Third, the recipient’s investment constraints will
be relevant. The recipient may have limits for the percentage of a firm’s
shares she can hold, be subject to constraints on short-selling or
borrowing, or may have limited funds available to invest. Fourth, the
amount of other trading in the market will impact the trading strategy
and information revelation. The more liquid the market for the stock in
question is, the easier it will be for an informed investor to trade without
revealing its advantage. 84 Fifth, and importantly for the selective
disclosure situation, the investor’s desire to maintain a relationship with
the firm will impact its trading strategy. The more aggressively the
investor trades on privately obtained information, the higher is the
likelihood that it will affect the stock price and make it apparent to the
regulator that she has an informational advantage. Since the party that
carries the most regulatory risk in such a situation is not the investor but
the disclosing firm, 85 a privately informed investor needs to choose
between two broad types of trading strategies: (i) trade aggressively with
a higher risk of detection and a resulting increased risk that the
relationship with the firm will be terminated due to a regulatory inquiry,
82.
83.

VIVES, supra note 76, at 339–47.
Cf. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang & Joshua Mitts, How Quickly Do Markets
Learn? Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment 27 (Colum. Bus.
Sch., Research Paper No. 15-6, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2544128 [https://perma.
cc/J5NP-9EXR] (finding evidence suggesting that traders with private information trade
strategically, depending on the expected length of their trading advantage).
84. See Collin-Dufresne & Fos, supra note 79 (finding that information traders
increase trading with a rise in stock liquidity); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 81 (noting that
informed trading may “fail entirely to move prices if the level of background ‘noise
trading’ is sufficiently high”).
85. The firm carries more risk since Reg. FD does not apply to the investor. See
infra Part II.
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or (ii) trade moderately, with a low risk of detection and a high
likelihood of maintaining the relationship into the next period.
If the recipient finds herself in a situation where she is unable to
trade, e.g., due to investment constraints, she may, of course, decide to
share the information with another investor who is so able. It may
indeed be useful for an information trader to establish informal
reciprocal relationships with like-minded investors in order to benefit
when other investors are similarly unable to trade. 86 Such secondary
selective disclosure could have some positive impact on market
efficiency, depending on how the secondary information recipients view
the five factors outlined above.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is one where a selective
disclosure recipient may rationally trade in a way that leaves
information less than fully incorporated into prices. Indeed, in certain
configurations of the five factors sketched out above, the information
will never affect the stock price at all.
In conclusion, when information is distributed to only one investor,
this recipient receives a valuable trading advantage. On the other side of
the spectrum where information is disclosed broadly, relative market
efficiency is high and recipients do not receive any trading advantages
on average. In-between these end-points, the two effects will exhibit
some progressive development. We can then illustrate the corporate
manager’s choice between disclosure methods as a trade-off between
improving market efficiency and conferring value on recipients, as in
Figure 2.

86. Cf. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing
how information was relayed between financial analysts at different buy-side
institutions).
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Figure 2. Trading Value to a Recipient of Different Corporate Disclosure
Methods

Figure 2 shows that a public firm can either have secrecy or
increased market efficiency with regards to a particular item of NPI, but
not meaningful degrees of both at the same time. In sum, there appears
to be little expected market efficiency benefit to investors as a group of
the practice of selective disclosure, unless the firm selectively discloses
the information to larger groups.
b. Monitoring Benefits?
If it is doubtful that private meetings with investors produce notable
market efficiency benefits, such meetings may instead be beneficial to
investors at large by providing a forum where professional investors can
engage in monitoring and verification by questioning the public
reporting presented by management and verified, in part, by the
auditors. This is the “ferreting out” activity that the SEC and the
Supreme Court agreed was beneficial in Dirks.87 The social benefit of
private investor meetings may then arise from their function of ensuring
that managers’ disclosure decisions are unbiased—with an ex ante
87.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
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disciplining effect, as managers will be aware that they will need to
justify their disclosure decisions to investment experts, and with an ex
post effect of verifying the actual disclosures made.
However, the investors who take part in private meetings will not
be inclined to share their findings broadly, as we have just seen that they
profit more from private information. Additionally, the extent to which
managers opt to subject themselves to such monitoring is entirely
voluntary and unknown to shareholders. This may lead to a situation
where honest managers subject themselves to monitoring by more
skillful or diligent investors, whereas less honest managers—who Dirks
itself took aim at—can choose not to subject themselves to investor
monitoring or only meet with investors who are less skillful monitors.88
An argument that selective disclosure practices are beneficial may
proceed by claiming that by leaving something (i.e., value-relevant
information) on the table, active investors may be more attracted to meet
with managers to monitor them for the benefit of all investors. 89
Whether this would work in practice would depend on the managers’
skill and interest in choosing to meet participants who have the
motivation to conduct monitoring and verification instead of those only
looking to acquire the NPI.
D. CORPORATE ACCESS AS A MEDIUM FOR INVESTOR MEETINGS
As information about listed securities is more valuable the more
privately it is received, the demand for selectively disclosed information
and the willingness to pay for it is obvious. Active investors will prefer
to receive information as privately as possible in order to have a larger
window of exclusivity in which to profit from the NPI. Several factors
may affect the amount an investor would be willing to pay for
information, such as the statutory materiality threshold (above which the
insider trading and Reg. FD frameworks may apply), the quality and
88. While one reason for managers choosing not to participate in investor meetings
may be an unwillingness to be monitored in this way, another reason (as noted in
Section I.B, supra) is to ensure that information reaches all investors simultaneously.
There is consequently nothing inherently honest or dishonest about a firm’s choice not
to participate in investor meetings.
89. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003) (discussing costs and benefits of the
presence of controlling shareholders).
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usefulness of management’s disclosures in previous meetings, the
amount of uncertainty surrounding the firm’s future (the more
uncertainty, the more valuable the information may be), and perhaps
also the perceived skill, knowledge or frankness of management. While,
on the one hand, it is rational for investors to economize on information
costs (for example, by pooling together in the employment of securities
analysts and other experts to study and issue reports on firms to reduce
verification costs),90 information is, on the other hand, not valuable for
trading purposes if everyone has access to it, which is why investors
rationally demand NPI directly from managers.91
A recently introduced offering that caters to investors’ demand for
private information is “corporate access,” an investor meeting arranging
service now provided by all major investment banks. 92 As part of
invitation-only conferences or non-deal roadshows, these intermediaries
arrange private meetings where selected investors can meet with senior
managers of public firms to ask questions and learn more about the
firms than is available in the public domain.93 In return, the participating
investors route their trading based on the information they learn through
the arranging banks’ brokerage departments 94 and award them higher
commissions depending on the quality of the information.95 This method
90.
91.

Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 600.
Investors may, of course, find it economical to pool their resources in an
investment fund that acquires NPI; the point here is that such a fund will need to trade
against an uninformed trader in order to profit from its NPI.
92. John Brinkley, Managing Face Time: What IROs Need to Know About
Working with Corporate Access Providers, IR UPDATE, Nov. 2012, at 14, 15.
93. Roadshows generally consist of both public and one-on-one meetings. See
GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 165.
94. Brokers may be compensated for ancillary services such as providing access to
meetings with senior corporate managers in accordance with the framework on socalled ‘soft dollars’ in section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(e) (2012). This is a safe harbor provision which protects investment managers
from liability for breach of fiduciary duty solely on the basis that they paid more than
the lowest commission in order to receive ‘‘brokerage and research services’’ from a
broker-dealer. The SEC has explicitly included corporate access as a service which
qualifies for this safe harbor. See Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission
Practices under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 54,165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,985–86 (July 24, 2006) (“Meetings with
corporate executives to obtain oral reports on the performance of a company are eligible
because reasoning or knowledge will be imparted at the meeting.”).
95. T. Clifton Green et al., Broker-Hosted Investor Conferences, 58 J. ACCT. ECON.
142 (2014).
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for charging participants based on the quality of information they
receive, which allows intermediaries to withhold future corporate access
from investors who do not pay, appears to present an apt solution to the
problem of establishing a price for information. 96 The public firms
themselves do not typically pay to participate in corporate access
events.97
Corporate access is now a significant industry. A majority of public
firms participate in one-on-one meetings arranged as part of analystsponsored investment conferences, attending an average of eight such
96. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615
(1962) (describing the “fundamental paradox” that the “value [of information] for the
purchaser is not known until he has received the information, but then he has in effect
acquired it without cost”).
97. The head of corporate access at one large investment bank has described an
ideal corporate access event as follows:

Yahoo! says to me, ‘UBS, we’d like you to host us on a road show.
We’re looking to find new shareholders. What do you think? ‘And I
say, ‘Okay, I know there are some people who are interested in your
stock in Chicago, so why don’t we go to Chicago?’
Yahoo! representatives come with us, they do a day of meetings,
they do a group lunch in Chicago. They tell their story, they tell
everyone why this new CEO is going to change things and why it’s a
great investment from here on out.
A bunch of those investors say, ‘You know, I think it is time to buy
Yahoo! stock.’ They will call up their UBS sales trader and say,
‘You know what, we’re thinking of buying Yahoo! Give us 10
million shares.’
So we get a commission on that trade. Yahoo! is happy because it
got a new shareholder, we’re happy because we got some
commissions off the back of it, and the investors are happy because
they got to meet with management.
Brinkley, supra note 92 (also comparing corporate access to a free five-star concierge
service); see also GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 163–64 (proposing criteria for evaluating
corporate access services, mentioning that such services are “the least-costly solution
for the issuer”); Brusch, supra note 51 (noting that intermediaries are “typically paid by
commission”).
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events per year and meeting twenty-two investors per event.98 Estimates
suggest that institutional investors pay brokers over $1 billion per year
for corporate access.99 Individual meetings may be worth between $3500
and $20,000, the latter figure being the going rate for a meeting with a
marquee CEO.100 Some firms may use their participation in corporate
access events as a form of payment to corporate access providers by
participating in meetings with clients that are important to the
intermediary even though the firm would not typically meet with such
an investor.101 This demonstrates awareness that managers’ attendance is
valuable to investors and thereby to the intermediaries. 102 Corporate
access is considered further in Section II.D.2.
II. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISES OF REGULATION FD
Demand for NPI is understandably strong: we have seen that NPI
disclosed in private meetings can be valuable and that investors pay
significant sums for it. This part explores the design and effects of the
applicable federal securities regulation in order to determine the
regulatory perimeter for selective disclosure. It proceeds in a relatively,
but not completely, chronological way in an attempt to describe how the

98. NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., supra note 32, (finding that 98% of the 392
firms that replied had taken part in a one-on-one meeting in an analyst sponsored
conference).
99. Referencing a 2010 study by Greenwich Associates, Brusch, supra note 51,
found that “total U.S. equity commission payments allocated to sell-side research and
related services represent approximately $6.4 billion. . . . [O]f this $6.4 billion,
institutions used about 19 percent to reward brokers for facilitating access to corporate
management teams and 14 percent to compensate sponsors of research conferences,”
for a total of $2.1 billion. Accordingly, institutions spent approximately 33% of equity
commissions on access services on average, while the sub-group of hedge funds spent
closer to 40%. See also Brad Allen, How the Money Flows, IR MAG., SUPPLEMENT:
CORPORATE ACCESS: MEETING THE CHALLENGE, Dec. 2011 (referencing the same data
with similar conclusions). A more recent annual spend figure on corporate access
services may be $1.4 billion. See Ng & Troianovski, supra note 4.
100. Allen, supra note 99; Steve Johnson, Fears Rise over Cash for Access, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2013, at 1.
101. Brinkley, supra note 92, at 16.
102. See GUIMARD supra note 30, at 102 (noting generally that “management time is
incredibly valuable”); NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., supra note 32, at 15 (quoting a
conference participant noting that attendance at a conference is “doing [the broker] a
favor”).
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regulatory framework evolved and how analysts, investors, and
corporate managers appear to have adapted.
A. THE SUPREME COURT DEVELOPS INSIDER “TIPPING” IN DIRKS V. SEC
The scope of permissible disclosures of NPI in private investor
meetings is limited by two main sources of federal law and regulation:
the prohibition on insider trading and the SEC’s Reg. FD. The federal
prohibition on insider trading is based on Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 103 “a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative
devices,”104 and Rule 10b-5, which the SEC issued under that section.105
Neither the statute nor the regulation provides much detail to establish
the contours of a regulatory regime governing insider trading or tipping,
which instead has developed through federal common law under two
distinct theories. The classical theory targets insiders of the firm and
holds that they are prohibited from trading the firm’s shares based on
material NPI due to a special “relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation.” 106 This relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose the
material information before (or abstain from) trading in order to
“prevent[] a corporate insider from . . . tak[ing] unfair advantage of . . .
uninformed . . . stockholders.”107 The misappropriation theory expands
the scope of insider trading liability to outsiders of the corporation who
possess material NPI about a firm and use it to trade “in breach of a duty
owed to the source.” 108 This Article proceeds with a focus on the
classical theory, which conforms well to the investor relations situation

103.
104.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–06 (1976) (quoting Stock
Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran)).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
106. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
107. Id. at 228–29 (citation omitted).
108. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
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where managers privately provide NPI to investors to convince them to
buy the firm’s stock in the market.109
Insider trading liability extends to outsiders who receive
information from an insider under the framework on tipping established
by the Supreme Court in the still leading case of Dirks v. SEC.110 In this
case, Dirks, an investment analyst, obtained information from a former
employee of the publicly-traded firm Equity Funding that its assets were
fraudulently overstated. The whistleblower informed Dirks that
regulators had failed to take any action, and encouraged him to verify
and expose the wrongdoing. 111 Dirks met with Equity Funding’s
employees, some of whom confirmed the allegations, and he then
disclosed the information to his clients and investors who sold their
stock in the firm.112 The Supreme Court held that “tippees must assume
an insider’s duty to the shareholders . . . not to trade . . . when the insider
has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there
has been a breach.”113 The insider’s duty to shareholders is to use the
information solely for corporate purposes and not for personal benefit.
After Dirks, an important test for establishing whether a private
disclosure from a corporate insider to an investor is permissible under
the insider trading framework is whether the insider receives a personal
benefit from the disclosure—without a personal benefit, there is no
breach of duty by the insider, and neither the insider nor the outsider
recipient can be held liable under section 10(b).114 The Supreme Court
established that the personal benefit assessment needs to be based on
objective criteria (not subjective intent), and noted three (ostensibly nonexhaustive) examples of benefits that, whether direct or indirect, would
qualify: “a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate
109. This delineation is for simplicity of presentation as “nearly all violations under
the classical theory of insider trading can be alternatively characterized as
misappropriations.” SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,
the elements needed to establish tipping liability are the same under both theories. See
id. at 1274–80; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v.
Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2012). But see SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77
(1st Cir. 2000).
110. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
111. Id. at 648-49.
112. Id. at 649.
113. Id. at 660.
114. Id. at 647.
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into future earnings . . . [or] a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend” (since this would be equivalent to the insider
trading personally and gifting the profits to the recipient). 115 As the
regular investor meeting setting would not produce a pecuniary gain for
the participating manager, the applicable personal benefits would be the
scenarios involving a reputational benefit or a gift.116
In addition to disclosing material NPI selectively for a personal
benefit, an insider tipper needs to act with scienter to be subject to
insider trading liability. This means that a manager in our private
meeting scenario needs to know or exhibit severe recklessness in not
knowing that the information disclosed is both material and nonpublic.117 As tippee liability is derivative of tipper liability, an investor
who receives negligent disclosure from a manager in a private meeting
can thus trade on it without violating the insider trading framework. The
test of the required state of mind for a recipient is based partly on a
negligence standard, as it is sufficient that the recipient should know that
the insider breached fiduciary duty by disclosing the information to
her.118 It appears, however, that the tippee’s trading must be intentional
or reckless in order to establish liability.119 When determining whether

115. Id. at 663–64. The Supreme Court recently interpreted Dirks in a case where an
insider gifted inside information to a relative, holding that such a gift was sufficient to
satisfy the personal benefit requirement to render the insider liable. See Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
116. Further developments and the current status of the personal benefit requirement
are analyzed infra Section II.E.
117. VIII LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION
156–57 (4th ed. 2012); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 n.11 (Blackmun, Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“[I]f the insider in good faith does not believe that the
information is material or nonpublic, he . . . lacks the necessary scienter.”) (citing Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)).
118. See supra text accompanying note 113.
119. The Second Circuit has held that “Dirks’ knows or should know standard
pertains to a tippee’s knowledge that the tipper breached a duty . . . to his corporation’s
shareholders . . . by relaying confidential information,” while the “requirement of
intentional [or reckless] conduct pertains to the tippee’s eventual use of the tip through
trading.” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012). However, in United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–48 (2d Cir. 2014), a criminal case, the Second Circuit
interpreted Dirks to require that a tippee actually know about the personal benefit.
Newman involved a tipping chain, so it may be easier to prove knowledge of the benefit
in the private investor meeting context as the meeting participant presumably would be
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tippees should know that information disclosed to them is material or
nonpublic, their level of sophistication in investments and amount of
prior contacts with the insider tipper may be taken into account.120 The
scienter requirement is thus an additional defense against honest
mistakes in a private meeting setting.
B. THE SEC RESPONDS WITH REG. FD
While Dirks did not preclude finding a firm itself guilty for tipping
material NPI for its own “personal” benefit, market participants viewed
it as permissive in this regard as long as there was no personal benefit to
the insider who actually carried out such disclosure.121 This view may
have gained adherents after the Supreme Court decided O’Hagan, which
suggested that selective disclosure could be authorized by the firm.122
The SEC found this development troubling as it could lead to a situation
where financial analysts were made dependent on information received
privately from managers, which could reduce their willingness to
undertake independent research and incentivize them to bias their
research to maintain management access.123
In a settled proceeding, the SEC had previously applied the insider
trading framework to selective disclosure by arguing that an insider who
provided information about upcoming earnings to selected investment
analysts had earned a personal benefit by preserving and strengthening
his reputation as Chairman and CEO.124 This construction was a way for
the SEC to connect selective disclosure to the reputational type of
personal benefit explicitly covered by Dirks. While this theory was not

the person alleged to provide it. For further analysis of the scienter requirement as it
applies to tippees, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 402–04.
120. LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 117, at 94.
121. Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,593 (noting that in cases where no clear
personal benefit was present, market participants viewed selective disclosure as
permitted).
122. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). See John C. Coffee Jr, Is Selective
Disclosure Now Lawful?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1997), for an analysis of the impact of the
decision on selective disclosure practices.
123. Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,591–93 (referring to a large amount of
such undesirable disclosures). The SEC also argued that “unerodable informational
advantages obtained through superior access to corporate insiders” could lead to a loss
of public confidence in the overall fairness of markets. Id. at 72,592 (citation omitted).
124. SEC v. Stevens, 48 SEC Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991).
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subjected to review by a court, its reasoning was criticized as an unduly
broad interpretation of Dirks.125
When the SEC in the late 1990s considered its options for how to
address the perceived problem of managers providing material NPI to
selected investors without a clear personal benefit to themselves, it
recognized two alternatives: it could either seek to extend the Dirks antifraud framework in the courts to disclosures where the firm itself
received the “personal benefit,” or it could impose a disclosure
obligation on firms to effectively nullify the benefits of selective
disclosures.126 The main author of Reg. FD127 has explained that while it
may have been possible to extend Dirks, this was considered a highly
undesirable alternative. Broadening the insider trading regime in this
way would have had such a strong deterrent effect that it would likely
have restricted many legitimate corporate communications as well. 128
Accordingly, the SEC preferred to instead introduce Reg. FD under its
125. Cf. Coffee, supra note 122 (arguing that one may be able to find such mixed—
corporate and personal—motives in any selective disclosure situation).
126. Richard L. Anderson et al., The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 273, 278 (2001) (citing Harvey Goldschmid).
127. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Passing
of Former SEC Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.sec.
gov/news/statement/statement-on-passing-of-harvey-goldschmid.html [https://perma.cc/
7X9J-LMJP] (describing Former Commissioner Goldschmid as “the primary architect
of Regulation FD”). Former Commissioner Goldschmid himself described his work on
Reg. FD modestly: “I was General Counsel at the SEC when FD was first presented. I
was a Special Senior Advisor to Chairman Levitt and . . . helped to finalize FD.”
Anderson et al., supra note 126, at 277.
128. Former Commissioner Goldschmid described the situation as follows:

If we were able to extend Dirks, the fraud stigma, private actions,
and treble-damage disgorgement, would be available to plaintiffs
and could have had a large chilling effect on communication. Large
amounts of litigation could have been stimulated and harsh
exposures to liability created. The fair and sensible thing to do, was a
rule-making that could provide relatively clear and prospective
guidance and could be carefully calibrated to preserve the flow of
legitimate, non-material information.
Anderson et al., supra note 126, at 279; see also Adopting Release, supra note 7, at
51,718 n.16 (noting the chilling effect of an insider trading action on corporate
disclosure and referring to Reg. FD as a “more measured approach”).
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authority to regulate disclosure, while clarifying that its approach neither
altered the insider trading jurisprudence in Dirks nor considered
selective disclosure to be fraudulent.129
The SEC was careful not to tie Reg. FD to sanctions that could
have any significant impact on issuers. Public firms and the regulator
feared that Reg. FD would have a “chilling” effect on firms’ disclosure
practices if there was a risk of meaningful enforcement against violators.
The problem identified was over-deterrence, and the risk was that firms
could stop talking to investors and that market efficiency would suffer
as a result. 130 The SEC took several steps to ensure that the new
regulation would not over-deter. Reg. FD explicitly provides that “no
failure to make a public disclosure required solely by [the regulation]
shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5,”131 which means that
private enforcement is not possible. It also provides that violations will
not impact the eligibility for short-form registration for securities
offerings or security holders’ ability to resell certain securities.132 The
SEC envisaged that its main enforcement tool and deterrence creator
would be “an administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order, or
a civil action seeking an injunction and/or civil money penalties.”133
Reg. FD provides that “whenever an issuer, or any person acting on
its behalf,134 discloses any material 135 nonpublic information regarding
that issuer or its securities to [certain recipients],136 the issuer shall make
public disclosure of that information” either simultaneously (in the case
of intentional selective disclosure) or promptly (if non-intentional).137
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,594.
Id. at 72,595.
17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2015).
Id. § 243.103 (2015).
Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,726.
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2015) defines a “[p]erson acting on behalf of an
issuer” as “any senior official of the issuer . . . or any other officer, employee, or agent
of an issuer who regularly communicates with [securities market professionals] or with
holders of the issuer’s securities.” 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(f) (2015), in turn, defines
“senior official” as to cover only a “director, executive officer, . . . investor relations or
public relations officer, or other person with similar functions.”
135. Reg. FD does not define materiality, as the SEC preferred to refer to the
developed securities case law over establishing a bright-line test or presenting an
exhaustive list of items to be considered material. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
136. See supra note 10.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2015).
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Disclosure is intentional “when the person making the disclosure either
knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is
communicating is both material and non-public.”138 For non-intentional
disclosures, Reg. FD allows firms to “promptly” disclose the
information up to twenty-four hours after a senior official knows or
should know of the mistake.139 The SEC decided to allow disclosures
within this time window so that firms could respond to accidental
disclosures in a considered way.140 Non-intentional selective disclosures
of material NPI that are brought to the attention of a senior official and
rectified with public disclosure within twenty-four hours thereof
consequently do not violate Reg. FD.141
Several features of Reg. FD may cause it to fail to restrict selective
disclosure as intended. For example, its exception for securities
offerings enables roadshows that one commentator has labeled “the
structural embodiment of selective disclosure.” 142 Another potential
opportunity to avoid Reg. FD coverage may be for analysts or investors
to speak to firm employees who are not covered by the regulation.143
138. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2015). The SEC remarked that the purpose of the
knowing or reckless standard is to reach the same mental state as the anti-fraud
provision so that “liability will arise only if no reasonable person . . . would have made
the same [materiality] determination.” See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2015). See supra note 12 for the text of this provision.
See also Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722-23.
140. See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722-23; Proposing Release, supra
note 7, at 72,596 n.48.
141. “Prompt” disclosure (i.e., disclosure “as soon as reasonably practicable”) also
implies that when firms are able to disclose sooner than at the end of the twenty-four
hour window, they should do so. See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,596 n.48.
142. The JOBS Act in Action: Overseeing Effective Implementation That Can Grow
American Jobs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub.
and Private Cos. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 2 (2012)
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School)
(arguing that the disapplication of Reg. FD for firms with fewer than 2000 shareholders
of record through the JOBS Act should be reconsidered).
143. Soltes, supra note 39, interviewed research directors of large sell-side
institutions and found a preference to have private discussions with divisional managers
because “they know the details of the business and they are less polished when
speaking with us.” Depending on the exact duties of such personnel, they may not be
considered executive officers under Reg. FD (17 C.F.R. §§ 243.101(c),(f) (2015) and
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2015)), see supra note 134, in which case Reg. FD appears not to
cover them unless they regularly engage in such communications. Acknowledging this
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The analysis below will, however, put these observations aside to
present the features of Reg. FD that are most relevant for establishing
the perimeter for day-to-day conversations between senior managers and
professional investors.
First, Reg. FD is an issuer disclosure obligation that does not apply
to recipients of information. This design has the effect that even if a firm
engages in selective disclosure in violation of Reg. FD, the insider
trading framework needs to apply to take action against the recipient.
Should the insider trading rules not apply, e.g., due to a lack of a
personal benefit to the insider, the recipient can lawfully trade on the
information obtained—even if it is material under the securities laws.
Put differently, Reg. FD is aimed at curbing the supply of selectively
disclosed information, not demand. Reg. FD will consequently not
prevent investors from trying to obtain the most value-relevant
information possible.144
Another potentially significant reason for the popularity of private
investor meetings is a declaration by the SEC that it will take into
account the circumstances surrounding a selective disclosure event in
determining whether a manager’s materiality determination is reckless:
“a materiality judgment that might be reckless in the context of a
prepared written statement would not necessarily be reckless in the
context of an impromptu answer to an unanticipated question.”145 The
SEC thus affords selective disclosure in personal conversations its
highest level of deference under Reg. FD. By assessing recklessness
more leniently in a private question-and-answer setting, it allows more
potent information to be disclosed in private meetings without being
characterized as intentional disclosure. As such disclosure then may be
classified as non-intentional, it will only need to be publicly disclosed
“promptly,” i.e., when—or if—a senior official knows or is reckless in
not knowing that material and non-public information has been
ambiguity, one research director noted that discussions with such personnel provided
more information but that their statements were never attributed to avoid implicating
them. See Soltes, supra note 39, at 268.
144. The SEC’s Director of Enforcement indicated that undue pressure by an
outsider to selectively disclose information could also constitute a violation of Reg. FD.
Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. Enf’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Speech Before the
Compliance & Legal Division of the Securities Industry Association: Regulation FD–
An Enforcement Perspective, (Nov. 1, 2000). However, no enforcement has taken place
on this basis.
145. Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722.
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selectively disclosed.146 Managers that would like to continue the preReg. FD practices of disclosing material information to selected
investors or analysts before they disclose to the public may consequently
prefer to make such disclosures in a private conversation, since they can
claim that they are non-intentional, impromptu disclosures.
A third reason for the popularity of investor meetings under Reg.
FD may be that the regulation creates a window for information trading
even in cases where the manager realizes that the information disclosed
is material. Non-intentional selective disclosure needs to be rectified by
“prompt” public disclosure of the information, but this can take place up
to twenty-four hours after a senior official learns of the disclosure
mistake. In practice, this gives an investor who privately receives
material information a significant trading advantage that could persist
for days or weeks. In a scenario where an investor asks probing
questions to provoke valuable answers and a manager reacts by
releasing value-relevant or even outright material information, the
recipient may start trading immediately.147 From the firm’s perspective,
it complies with Reg. FD as long as the information is publicly disclosed
in accordance with Reg. FD. By the time the firm releases the
information to the public (allowing it to become incorporated into the
stock price), the initial recipient could have already taken a significant
position in the stock to unwind at a profit.
Fourth, there is no oversight over the materiality determination. If a
manager makes a mistake in a private meeting without realizing it, the
only investor who knows about the information will be the meeting
recipient. While firms with a strong desire for correct and complete
disclosures may ensure that they have more than one person
participating in every investor conversation in order to detect mistaken
materiality determinations and effectuate public disclosure of the
information, one-on-one meetings do not allow for such oversight.
Without oversight, there is less likelihood that cases of mistaken

146.
147.

17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2015).
See John L. Campbell, Brady J. Twedt & Benjamin C. Whipple, Did
Regulation Fair Disclosure Prevent Selective Disclosure? Direct Evidence from
Intraday Volume and Returns (Working Paper, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2803308
[https://perma.cc/6WTD-Y2QA] (finding that Reg. FD disclosures are preceded by
increased trading).
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materiality determinations are detected and remediated by public
disclosure.
Fifth, Reg. FD does not require firms to take any action to prevent
recipients from trading. Reg. FD is designed so that it does not apply to
disclosures to recipients who agree to keep the NPI confidential,148 and
the SEC envisaged that managers who unintentionally disclosed material
NPI would ask recipients to refrain from trading on or disclosing the
information. 149 Should the recipient then proceed to trade anyway, it
would constitute insider trading. 150 While this design works well in
theory on the assumption that managers do not want to bestow
informational advantages on investors, the SEC failed to consider that
some managers may want recipients to be able to trade on material NPI.
In such cases, managers will not violate Reg. FD as long as they
consider their disclosures non-intentional and disclose the information
within the stipulated window; there is no requirement that issuers
request accidental recipients to refrain from trading on the information.
Thus, the design of the rule does not encourage the intended behavior.
A sixth feature of Reg. FD which may cause opportunistic
managers and investors to view it favorably is its failure to require
reporting to investors or the SEC when firms make corrective
disclosures under it. Firms that disclose material NPI by mistake are
allowed to make corrective disclosures in any way that “provide[s]
broad, non-exclusionary distribution . . . to the public,”151 and without
explaining that it has already been selectively disclosed. Shareholders
are consequently unable to tell, either via the method of disclosure or its
contents, that the information they are receiving may have been given
to, and used for trading by, other investors days—potentially even
weeks—earlier. This is a curiously inapt rule design given that the SEC
has highlighted that repeated mistaken materiality determinations could

148.
149.
150.
151.

17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2) (2015).
Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,720.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2015); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.
& RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 459 (8th ed. 2013)
(claiming that Form 8-K filings are a less utilized method than press releases for certain
Reg. FD disclosures); LAURA S. UNGER, COMM’R, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SPECIAL
STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REVISITED (2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/regfdstudy.htm [https://perma.cc/N2SB-UZ9D] (showing that issuers regarded a
Form 8-K filing as the least popular disclosure method).
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introduce doubt into the unintentional nature of the disclosure.152 It is
difficult to imagine how the regulator or investors could detect such
patterns of suspicious selective disclosures when they have nothing to
review. 153 This design means that some managers could make poor
materiality determinations followed by public disclosure of the
information on a regular basis without investors ever learning about it.154
An opportunistic manager could take advantage of Reg. FD while
feigning compliance. Consider a manager who would like to selectively
disclose material information to curry favor with a particular investor.
The manager may consider this venture less risky when aware that the
firm will disclose the information to the market in the next twenty-four
hours. This is because selective disclosure that the manager designates
as “non-intentional” should be cleansed by a public release of the
information within this time frame. As Reg. FD does not require any
particular form for the required public release of the information, the
firm’s pre-scheduled press release can also serve as the release that Reg.
FD requires. Managers can consequently give selected investors a
twenty-four hour trading advantage by selectively disclosing upcoming
news to them while labeling such disclosure non-intentional.155 While
such behavior would be a violation of Reg. FD, the SEC would face
formidable hurdles to a successful enforcement action, including
problems detecting that there has been a private conversation, proving
what was said, proving that it was material, and showing that the
disclosure was intentional and not—as the manager would claim—nonintentional. Reg. FD may be more of a roadmap for selective disclosures
than a roadblock.
152.
153.

Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,722 n.57.
In addition, research on Form 8-K filings relating to Reg. FD suggests that
firms that file after the twenty-four hour window exhibit abnormal stock price and
volume several days before these filings, indicating that some investors may have
access to the information before filing. See Paul A. Griffin, David H. Lont & Benjamin
Segal, Enforcement and Disclosure Under Regulation Fair Disclosure: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 ACCT. & FIN. 947 (2011).
154. Such behavior could even be common practice. See Brown et al. (2015), supra
note 31, at 14 (quoting an analyst describing how managers have “figured out how to
‘paper things up’ [with an 8-K]”).
155. See text accompanying notes 306-310, infra, for evidence that institutional
investors appear to be systematically informed in advance about firm-specific news
releases.
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C. THE SEC SUES, LOSES, AND RETREATS
Soon after the introduction of Reg. FD, the SEC indicated that it
would seek to enforce only “clear violations” of the rule. 156 Early
enforcement actions generally took the form of firms agreeing to ceaseand-desist orders in administrative proceedings. The SEC’s selection of
cases was interpreted as an attempt to provide advice about the types of
communications that raised concerns under Reg. FD. 157 In 2005,
however, the SEC encountered a setback as it opted to litigate against
Siebel Systems, Inc. for violating Reg. FD for the second time.158 The
SEC alleged that the firm’s CFO made positive private statements
during a one-on-one meeting and at a private dinner organized by an
investment bank, which were materially different from the negative
statements made by its CEO on an earnings call and a publicly
broadcasted conference presentation in previous weeks.159 As a result of
the private disclosures, the SEC alleged, one institutional investor
converted a short position to a long position of similar size, and other
recipients of the private information purchased shares.160 Siebel’s share
price increased 8% the day after the private meetings, and twice as many
shares as normal were traded.161
The SEC’s complaint focused on four disclosures of material NPI
at the two private events.162 The first concerned a statement that “there
were some $5 million deals in Siebel’s pipeline” 163 for the second
quarter. The others related to statements that “new deals were coming
into the sales pipeline;” “the company’s sales pipeline was ‘growing’ or
156. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WRITTEN STATEMENT CONCERNING REGULATION FAIR
DISCLOSURE (2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm [http://perm
a.cc/ALV8-6JJ2]; see also Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,718 (“[I]ssuers will
not be second-guessed on close materiality judgments. Neither will we, nor could we,
bring enforcement actions under Regulation FD for mistaken materiality determinations
that were not reckless.”).
157. Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information
Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 112, 118 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge ed., 2013).
158. SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F.Supp.2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
159. Complaint at ¶¶ 40–51, Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 694 (No. 04-CV-5130)
[hereinafter SEC Complaint].
160. Id. ¶¶ 46, 53.
161. Id. ¶ 54.
162. Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 701.
163. SEC Complaint, supra note 159, at ¶ 43.
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‘building;’” and “the company’s sales or business activity levels were
‘good’ or ‘better.’”164 In comparison, the CEO had publicly stated on an
earnings call the previous week that he anticipated that Siebel would
“see lots of small deals . . . some medium deals . . . a number of deals
over a million dollars. And I suspect we’ll see some greater than
five.”165 The SEC argued that while the CEO’s public statements were
forward-looking, qualified by the word “suspect” and generally also
qualified by references to the developments in the overall economy,166
the CFO’s private statements were in the present tense. 167 The court,
however, dismissed the case as it did not consider the private disclosures
to constitute material information. 168 The court was dismissive of the
SEC’s arguments and its scrutiny of “the tense of verbs and the general
syntax of each sentence,” which it held would place “an unreasonable
burden on a company’s management and spokespersons to become
linguistic experts.” 169 The court also found it instructive that the
information in question was not included among the specific categories
of information the SEC had noted in its Adopting Release.170
The Siebel Systems court also held that that the recipient’s opinion
regarding the materiality of selectively disclosed private information is
not indicative of a Reg. FD violation on its own.171 As a general rule,
this must be correct because any person’s trading based on subjective
beliefs cannot automatically be considered material in the eyes of the
reasonable investor. However, in Siebel Systems, even though
professional investors assisted by financial analysts found the
information sufficiently value-relevant to trade in a manner that
increased the share price by 8%, the court’s judgment of materiality
prevailed. 172 The resulting difference between the court’s objective
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 701.
Id. at 704.
SEC Complaint, supra note 159, at ¶ 49.
Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 704.
Id. at 696.
Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 704.
Id. at 708; Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,721 (outlining seven
categories of information that firms should examine for materiality).
171. Siebel Sys., 384 F.Supp.2d at 707 (citing Proposing Release, supra note 7, at
51,722) (stating that “Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer discloses
immaterial information whose significance is discerned by the analyst”).
172. See id.

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

81

assessment and investors’ subjective valuation can present trading
opportunities for recipients of selective disclosure.
The Siebel Systems court appears to have concluded that the
recipients of Siebel’s selective disclosure completed a mosaic of
information with non-material NPI from the firm to produce their own
material NPI.173 However, the case file does not show that the recipients
completed a mosaic that resulted in material information. Rather, it
indicates that the investors had previously received information in a
negative light from the firm in the form of an earnings warning and
statements from the CEO just two days before the selective
disclosures, 174 which were counteracted by more positive (albeit
generally phrased) statements from the CFO. Indeed, one of the main
conclusions of a research analyst at the investment bank organizing the
private dinner was that “the body language was positive.”175
The SEC’s defeat in Siebel Systems dampened its enforcement
activity. As can be seen from Table 1, which lists all Reg. FD
enforcement actions since the rule entered into force in October 2000,
the SEC concluded more Reg. FD enforcement actions in the three years
leading up to Siebel Systems than it has done in the eleven years since
that case was decided, and it has not attempted to litigate any further
cases.

173.
174.

Id. at 707.
SEC Complaint, supra note 159, at ¶ 37 (quoting the CEO, who stated publicly
two days before the selective disclosures, in relation to the economy, that “[w]ith war,
with famine, with disease, I mean it’s like the apocalypse out there”).
175. Id. at ¶ 52.
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Secure Computing
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Issuer Penalty?

Officer Penalty?

$0

$0

2

2002

Siebel Systems

$250,000

$0

3

2002

Raytheon178

$0

$0

$1,000,000

CEO: $50,000

4

2003

179

Schering-Plough
180

5

2004

Senetek

$0

$0

6

2005

Flowserve181

$350,000

CEO: $50,000

182

7

2005

Siebel Systems

N/A

N/A

8

2007

Electronic Data Systems183

$0

$0

9

2009

American Commercial

$0

CFO: $25,000

Lines184
10

2010

Presstek185

$400,000

CEO: $50,000

11

2010

Office Depot186

$1,000,000

CEO: $50,000

12

2011

Fifth Third Bancorp187

$0

$0

CFO: $50,000

176. Secure Computing Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46,895, 2002 WL
31643024 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Secure Computing Release].
177. Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,896, 2002 WL 31643027 (Nov.
25, 2002); Siebel Sys., Inc., Litigation Release No. 17,860, 2002 WL 31643062 (Nov.
25, 2002).
178. Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 46,897, 2002 WL 31643026 (Nov.
25, 2002).
179. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, 81 SEC Docket 54
(Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Schering-Plough Release].
180. Senetek PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,400, 83 SEC Docket 2319 (Sept.
16, 2004).
181. Flowserve Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51,427, 85 SEC Docket 92 (Mar.
24, 2005).
182. SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F.Supp.2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
183. Electronic Data Systems Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 56,519, 91 SEC
Docket 1800 (Sept. 25, 2007).
184. Black, Exchange Act Release No. 60,715, 96 SEC Docket 2440 (Sept. 24,
2009).
185. SEC v. Presstek, Inc., 103 SEC Docket 2555 (May 15, 2012); SEC v. Presstek,
Inc., 97 SEC Docket 3432 (Mar. 9, 2010).
186. McKay, Exchange Act Release No. 63,154, 99 SEC Docket 2196 (Oct. 21,
2010); Odland, Exchange Act Release No. 63,153, 99 SEC Docket 2193 (Oct. 21,
2010); Office Depot, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 63,152, 99 SEC Docket 2189
(Oct. 21, 2010).
187. Fifth Third Bancorp, Exchange Act Release No. 65,808, 102 SEC Docket 1779
(Nov. 22, 2011).
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2013

First Solar188

$0

83

VP (Investor
Relations): $50,000

Total:

$3,000,000

$325,000

Table 1: Reg. FD Enforcement Actions and Penalties Assessed189

The SEC has concluded enforcement actions relating to thirteen
selective disclosure events; all but one of them (Siebel Systems) in the
form of settled administrative actions. 190 Based on the information
provided in the SEC’s announcements of these enforcement actions, the
deterrent effect of Reg. FD on a corporate manager considering whether
to engage in intentional selective disclosure of material NPI can be
estimated from two factors: the risk of detection and the magnitude of
the sanctions imposed on detected violators.191
As regards the first component of deterrence—the risk of
detection—there are only two cases in Table 1 (Secure Computing and
Presstek) where the SEC has taken action in relation to selective
disclosures made directly to investors who traded the stock without
communicating the information to a broader group. The recipients in
these two cases probably attracted the SEC’s attention, however, by
their uninhibited trading. In Secure Computing, the recipients traded the
stock price up 15%, at more than double the normal trading volume, in
the two days before a significant firm announcement.192 In Presstek, the
CEO provided advance information of negative developments to a large
shareholder who immediately sold most of its shares, causing the stock

188. Polizzotto, Exchange Act Release No. 70,337 107 SEC Docket 468 (Sept. 6,
2013).
189. The table lists all Reg. FD enforcement actions from the regulation’s
promulgation until Feb. 10, 2017 (when this Article went to press).
190. The SEC has also issued two reports of investigation to aid issuers in the
application of Reg. FD. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No 46,898, 2002 WL
31650174 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Motorola Report]; Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and
Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No 69,279, 105 SEC Docket 4327 (Apr. 2,
2013).
191. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 465 (6th ed.
2011).
192. Secure Computing Release, supra note 176.
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price to drop 19%.193 In fact, all Reg. FD violations pursued by the SEC
entailed public circumstances that would have been relatively easy for
the regulator to observe, as each case either exhibited significant
unexplained movement in stock price or volume (nine cases), 194 or
involved selective disclosure to sell-side analysts who disseminated the
information (ten cases).195 The SEC has never enforced Reg. FD in a
case where the recipient kept the NPI private and traded cautiously.196
The risk of detection appears very low for such cases involving more
sophisticated information trading.
With regard to the second component of deterrence—the magnitude
of sanctions—Table 1 shows that just over half of the SEC enforcement
actions have resulted in civil penalties; the remainder typically
concluded only with the issuance of cease-and-desist orders. The
amounts of the penalties are clearly unlikely to create deterrence.
Penalties assessed on firms do not have any direct impact on managers
and may not deter them, 197 and penalties assessed on managers are
negligible,198 even before scaling them to expected value to account for
193. Complaint, SEC v. Presstek, Inc., 97 SEC Docket 3432 (No. 1:10-cv-10406),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21443.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9L
C-GTW4]. Drawing further attention to the case, the press reported a potential leak.
Update 1-Presstek Shares Hit Year-Low After Weak Q3 Outlook, Reuters, Sept. 26,
2006, Factiva, Doc. No. LBA0000020060929e29t0018d. Expressed in the mode of
analysis in Section I.C.3.a, supra, the shareholder appears to have decided that the
option to trade more aggressively and risk ending the relationship with the firm had a
higher present value than trading slowly and maintaining access to information in future
periods.
194. See enforcement actions 1–2, 4, 6–7, and 9–12 supra Table 1.
195. See enforcement actions 2–9, 11, and 13 supra Table 1.
196. Of course, one cannot infer that selective disclosure under less public
circumstances than Secure Computing and Presstek would not be enforced, but the lack
of any such Reg. FD enforcement action is nonetheless a strong indication that the SEC
does not have the ability to detect disclosures without publicly observable elements.
197. Cf. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992)
(demonstrating the inefficient circularity of enterprise liability for securities fraud).
198. The maximum penalty the SEC has imposed on a manager—$50,000—equals
no more than a few days’ pay for a senior manager of a public firm. See J.M.F.,
Inequality in America: Why CEO-Pay Rules Won’t Help, ECONOMIST: GRAPHIC DETAIL
(Aug. 6, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/inequ
ality-america [http://perma.cc/97X5-LD5R] (estimating average annual CEO pay
among 3000 companies to be $5 million).
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the low risk of detection. Furthermore, managers typically have
indemnification arrangements to shield them from paying penalties out
of personal funds.199 A manager may, of course, incur a reputational cost
as a result of an enforcement action, but the direction of the reputational
effect is not clear-cut: recipients of valuable selective disclosures may
view the manager more favorably, whereas those that did not receive
NPI may take an unfavorable view.
The reason why penalties assessed on managers fail to deter
selective disclosure is that they do not relate to the trading advantages
actually conferred on information recipients. Put differently, the
penalties that may be imposed for detected violations do not outweigh
the value of investor goodwill managers can purchase by engaging in
selective disclosure. For example, in Schering-Plough two informed
investors saved tens of millions of dollars by trading before the public
release of information, while the manager incurred a relatively miniscule
$50,000 penalty.200 The manager awarded the favored investors a trading
gain that was more than 1000 times larger than the penalty imposed on
him. 201 The insignificant effects of a Reg. FD violation may, in such
circumstances, invite managers to ignore the regulation in order to
199. Only once in 16 years—in Office Depot—has the SEC barred a violating
manager from seeking reimbursement or indemnification. All Reg. FD settlements have
been on the basis of the managers and firms neither admitting nor denying any
violation, circumstances which typically enable firm indemnification. E.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2015).
200. Fidelity and Putnam were among the recipients of advance information and
each sold more than 10 million shares during the Reg. FD violation period. ScheringPlough’s stock price was $21.32 before the violation started, $17.64 when trading
closed on the final day before the information was publicly disclosed, and $16.10 when
the market opened after having received the information. Estimating that these two
investors sold at the average stock price during the persisting Reg. FD violation (as
their actual trading data is not available), they would have saved $3.38/share, calculated
as (($21.32+$17.64)/2)-$16.10), or at least $67.6 million. See Schering-Plough Release,
supra note 179; Floyd Norris, Market Place; S.E.C. Penalizes Schering-Plough over a
Fair Disclosure Violation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at C5.
201. This calculation uses the estimated private trading gains as calculated in note
200, supra, but the actual gains were greater as there were further private recipients (for
whom we do not have trading details). As discussed in note 199, supra, the manager
could also have been indemnified by the firm. The end result seems to be that neither
the shareholders who sold due to the information they received selectively nor the
disclosing manager paid any penalties. However, the shareholders who bought shares
from the informed investors would, as shareholders and residual claimants, be paying
part of the penalty.
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preserve or improve their reputation with important investors. 202 This
creates significant opportunities for value extraction from uninformed
shareholders.
The SEC has little ability to create deterrence through Reg. FD
enforcement actions. The penalties it may assess against natural persons
are capped at $160,000,203 while the benefits managers confer relate to
the market capitalization of their firms. As an illustration, consider a
case where the facts of the Reg. FD enforcement action relating to
Schering-Plough 204 are applied to a hypothetical firm with the same
market capitalization as the country’s largest public firm ($693
billion).205 In Schering-Plough, the privately released NPI reduced the
firm’s market capitalization by 24.5% when the private information was
publicly released but the investors who were tipped off had the
opportunity to avoid losses by selling early.206 If that same scenario were
applied to the hypothetical firm, it would lose $169 billion of market
capitalization. If investors owning just 5% of that firm were given
advance information and sold their stock before others found out, they
could save $8.4 billion—an amount 53,000 times larger than the
maximum penalty the SEC is able to assess on the manager. This
imbalance between the benefits that can be conferred and the penalties
that can be imposed may produce an attractive risk-return trade-off to
some managers wishing to build personal goodwill with investors.
The deterrent effect of a dollar-denominated penalty decreases with
market capitalization due to the size of the benefit available to investors,
but also because managers of larger firms have higher salaries. The
current practice of imposing a monetary penalty with a predetermined
cap is unlikely to achieve deterrence; this would require more significant

202. Note that no actions have been taken against the recipients in any of the Reg.
FD actions, since they may lawfully trade on the information. When asked about
Fidelity’s sales of more than 10 million Schering-Plough shares on the private
information, their representative could truthfully answer: “We complied with all rules
and regulations in our meeting with Schering-Plough and in our conduct thereafter.”
Norris, supra note 200.
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1005 (2015).
204. Schering-Plough Release, supra note 179.
205. See the market capitalization of Apple, Inc. as of Feb. 10, 2017 at https://ychart
s.com/companies/AAPL/market_cap [https://perma.cc/ PW5M-SF7].
206. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
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enforcement tools than those used by the SEC in Reg. FD enforcement
actions to date.207
If SEC enforcement actions themselves are not a deterrent,
however, it may be that the stock market reaction to selective disclosure
events could produce such an effect. One study found that an SEC
announcement of a Reg. FD violation caused firms to lose an average of
4% of their market capitalization.208 As the loss in market value does not
reflect the penalties imposed by the SEC, a reasonable interpretation
seems to be that the market penalizes firms with poor selective
disclosure practices, viewing them as riskier and charging them a higher
cost of capital, which lowers the stock price. This suggests that investors
in the stock market could be enlisted to assist with creating deterrence,
which will be analyzed further in Part IV.
D. MARKET PARTICIPANTS ADAPT
With valuable corporate NPI available to enrich those who acquire
or discover it, we should expect analysts and investors to try to satisfy
their demand for information as much as possible within the perimeters
of the securities laws. Investors already employ various ingenious
methods to lawfully refine their discovery and analysis of value-relevant
information. Equity research providers have been known to hire former
CIA agents to analyze management’s verbal and non-verbal cues during
earnings conference calls.209 A brokerage firm hired an FBI profiler to
teach its analysts and portfolio managers to interpret managers’ cues and
determine the veracity of the managers’ statements. 210 Specialized
speech software analyzing a CEO’s voice during earnings conference
calls can predict whether firms will later be subject to adverse

207. For example, § 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(2012), which allows for higher fines and prison sentences for willful violations, has
never been employed in Reg. FD cases.
208. See Griffin et al., supra note 153, at 966-968 (finding that firms lost
approximately 4% on average in the four days following an SEC announcement and 9%
in the ten days following an announcement, although with very limited data due to the
low frequency of Reg. FD enforcement).
209. EAMON JAVERS, BROKER, TRADER, LAWYER, SPY: THE SECRET WORLD OF
CORPORATE ESPIONAGE 173-179 (2010).
210. Brown et al. (2015), supra note 31, 16.
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restatements of their financial statements. 211 These examples all
illustrate the high level of inventiveness and ever-increasing
sophistication on the demand side of the market for information. Since
investors may trade on NPI they receive from insiders as long as they do
not provide them with any personal benefit in return, we should expect
professional investors to push for as much private information as
possible. Similarly on the supply side, managers may find that the
benefits of selective disclosure outweigh the expected costs of Reg. FD
enforcement.
It is inevitable that a regulation aiming to prevent willing parties
from transacting with each other will be closely examined for potential
functional substitutes. This section explores how market practices have
evolved after the introduction of Reg. FD, and it appears likely that this
evolution can be at least partially explained as a response to changes in
the regulatory environment. In addition to Reg. FD, the Global Analyst
Research Settlements have contributed to changes in investors’ and
analysts’ interactions with public firms because they prevent sell-side
analysts from being compensated in relation to investment banking
services and may have forced them to seek other sources of revenue.212
However, while regulatory changes may have triggered the emergence
of the phenomena below, their causes are less important than their
effects as we continue to evaluate the efficacy of Reg. FD today.
1. Analyst Research Goes Private
In Dirks, the Supreme Court wanted to protect the activity of
securities analysts.213 Quoting the SEC’s brief, the Court noted that it
was “commonplace for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze information’ .
211. Jessen L. Hobson, William J. Mayew & Mohan Venkatachalam, Analyzing
Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 349 (2012).
212. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC FACT SHEET ON GLOBAL ANALYST RESEARCH
SETTLEMENTS (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm [https://perma.cc/
9353-C69A] (describing settlement terms); Spotlight on the Global Research Analyst
Settlement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 12, 2005) https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
globalsettlement.htm [https://perma.cc/6KV8-4A2M] (providing references to major
documents related to the settlement).
213. For an analysis of the policy rationale, see, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD
and Foreign Issuers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 653
(2000-2001).
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. . by meeting with and questioning corporate officers,” and that this
activity could improve market efficiency for the benefit of investors.214
Dirks, however, had an unusual fact pattern involving a financial analyst
who was informed of fraud within a public firm. Financial analysts did
not at that time, nor do they now, prioritize searching for fraud in the
firms they cover. 215 In Dirks, when protecting the relevant disclosure
and noting the positive effects of analysts’ work, the court clearly had in
mind traditional sell-side analysts who disclose information they
uncover by sending market letters to their clients. However, Dirks had
broader effects by allowing any tippee to trade freely on acquired
information as long as it does not provide a personal benefit to the
insider tipper in exchange. In effect, Dirks protects selective disclosures
regardless of whether the envisaged market efficiency benefits actually
materialize in the individual case.
As NPI is more valuable in private forums, it is not surprising that
the work product of sell-side analysts is increasingly disseminated in
private and without any written reports.216 One particular business model
for analysts is to provide research only to a very limited number of
clients who pay large amounts for such private information on the basis
that it can be used for profitable trading.217 This trend towards increasing
secrecy is important to consider in approaching selective disclosure
regulation because it shows that, regardless of whether a manager
chooses an investor or an analyst as the recipient of selective disclosure,
the information may never become public or incorporated into the stock
214.
215.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
Brown et al. (2015), supra note 31, at 24 (finding from interview and crosssectional evidence that analysts do not prioritize investigating potential financial
misrepresentation); Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 43, Dirks, 463
U.S. at 646 (No. 82-276) (arguing that analysts do not view themselves as
“investigators of criminal activities”).
216. See Green et al., supra note 95, at 144 (describing how brokers who previously
used research to target individual investors now instead focus on hedge funds, who
dislike written reports and prefer private discussions); Jill Fisch, Does Analyst
Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 73–74 (2007) (detailing
practices of research firms to provide customized research to institutional clients). Cf.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 726 (1984) (writing the year after Dirks that “[t]ypically,
securities research is reduced to an analyst’s report that is circulated among prominent
institutional investors”).
217. Fisch, supra note 216, at 73-74 (citing work indicating that hedge funds pay up
to $350,000 per quarter for access to private research).
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price. 218 When recipients receive information privately and trade in a
way that does not allow for decoding,219 the rationale for protecting the
work product of analysts endorsed in Dirks—that the benefits of
selective disclosure redound to all investors—fails to materialize. The
development towards increased private dissemination of research
consequently reduces the market efficiency justification for selective
disclosure embraced by the SEC and the Supreme Court.
The benefit of Dirks in an environment where information is
increasingly disseminated privately is not that information selectively
disclosed to analysts or investors regularly benefits investors at large.
Instead, the contrary becomes more likely: investors keep their
information advantages private.220 Neither can the benefit be that very
positive information will become known to investors because corporate
managers themselves have strong incentives to publicly disclose such
information relatively promptly. Instead, the value of Dirks may come
from its protection of selective disclosures of transformatively bad
information. As follows from the stylized five considerations affecting
how a selective disclosure recipient may be expected to trade, 221 the
largest chance that investors will trade in a way that allows for decoding
occurs when they find themselves in a last-period scenario where they
are no longer concerned about their reputation with the managers of the
firm. Highly negative information is also, however, the kind of
information that managers typically prefer to keep private. It may thus
be that the main benefit of Dirks, as investors adapt to maximize their
benefits of its wide protective perimeter by keeping both the disclosure
event and their trading away from public view, is that it protects
whistleblowers within the firm.
2. Corporate Access Cuts Out the Implicated Intermediary
Corporate access appears to have been introduced in response to
regulatory changes when financial analysts who were no longer able to
distribute material NPI from public firms sought other ways to

218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra Section I.C.3.a.
See supra Section I.C.3.a.
See supra Section I.C.3.a.
See supra Section I.C.3.a.
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intermediate between managers and investors.222 Corporate access may
be a cost-effective method for firms to have several investor meetings in
one day at one venue with the administration covered by another party.
By attending a broker’s event, managers can also confer value on the
broker to build goodwill for the benefit of the firm which may be drawn
upon in the future. More investor conferences are being held following
the introduction of Reg. FD, 223 which could mean that selective
disclosure has moved to such venues. Corporate access also presents a
few potential problems, however, that will now be introduced and
briefly explored.
The first problem relates to potential conflicts of interest. When
corporate access is paid for by investors’ trading commissions 224 and
structured so that brokers can influence the selection of investors firms
meet with, there is a conflict of interest for the corporate access
intermediary who may prefer that the firm meets with its investor clients
who trade the most instead of the investors most suitable for the firm.
There are many examples and warnings in the investor relations
literature that suggest that this conflict of interest is frequently borne out
in practice. 225 Corporate access providers have themselves
222. According to the head of corporate access at one large investment bank, Reg.
FD and the Global Analyst Research Settlement made it more difficult for financial
analysts to provide the NPI its large investor clients demanded, which provided the
impetus for them to instead supply clients with direct connections between investors
and senior managers. Brinkley, supra note 92, at 15.
223. Brian J. Bushee, Michael L. Jung & Gregory S. Miller, Conference
Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 1163, 1173 (2011)
(presenting data showing that the number of conferences grew from approximately
2000 conferences in 1999—the year before Reg. FD was introduced—to just over
16,000 conferences in 2007).
224. See supra Section I.D.
225. See GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 163 (stating that banks try to persuade issuers
to meet with high-volume traders); id. at 166 (noting that banks may try to schedule
more one-on-one meetings than the issuer’s managers can efficiently manage); IPREO,
GLOBAL CORPORATE ACCESS STUDY (2013) 2, 4 (quoting issuer representatives
describing it as a “battle between who we would like to meet and who the broker sets us
up with” and “the usual frustration” where brokers want issuers to meet with their
preferred clients while the issuers “want to visit long-only, low-turnover institutions”);
REAL IR, WHO SERVES THE IR DIRECTOR? (2007) 47 (quoting survey participants
describing it as “the perennial problem” and “a huge conflict”); Brusch, supra note 51
(noting that since intermediaries are compensated on commission, “their natural focus
is on marketing you to their high-frequency trader clients”); Laurie Havelock and Tim
Human, The IRO View, IR MAG., SPECIAL REPORT 1: CORPORATE ACCESS, 2014, 12 at
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acknowledged the risk of a conflict of interest when they are allowed to
choose or influence which investors firms meet.226 Yet, more than one
third of firms that participate in one-on-one meetings in private investor
conferences may leave investor selection to the conference organizers.227
The decision of which investors to meet must, however, ultimately be
the responsibility of firms’ senior corporate managers. While
shareholders may legitimately be interested in learning which investors
receive information advantages from managers, the corporate purposes
of selective disclosures or the process for selecting information
recipients, there is no reason to subject investor selection in corporate
access events to different rules than investor meetings organized by the
firm itself.
The second potential problem stems from the fact that managers
confer value on brokers by attending their conferences because they may
leverage their participation in such events to indirectly pressure brokers
into providing positive research on their firms. This would be another
version of the problem that Reg. FD set out to solve: managers
providing material NPI to supportive brokers and withholding it from
unsupportive brokers. 228 A strong reason for the SEC’s enactment of
Reg. FD was that the perception of systematic inequalities in access to
information could lead the public to lose confidence in the securities
markets. 229 The problem the SEC identified was that managers—with
personal incentives tied to the stock price—could try to censure the
public discussion and evaluation of their firms by awarding or
withholding information. If managers were to succeed in such
censuring, it could bias analysts’ stock recommendations and result in
share prices that were higher than warranted, thus distorting the
market’s pricing function and allocative efficiency.230 This problem may
not have been solved by the introduction of Reg. FD; instead, it may
13 (quoting a large US firm saying that corporate access meetings are “a constant battle
to suppress the sell side’s attempts to fill our schedules with hedge funds”).
226. Brinkley, supra note 92, at 16.
227. NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., supra note 32, at 11 (finding that 36% of firms
do not always participate in selecting which investors to meet).
228. See, e.g., Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,716-17.
229. See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,592.
230. Cf. Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current
State of Corporate Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549, 552–53 (2004) (describing how
overvaluation has negative effects on individual firms).
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simply have transformed so that disclosures that were previously made
to supportive financial analysts are now made directly to the investors
they designate.231
The third possible problem is that corporate access results in
unequal access to information among investors without disadvantaged
investors being aware. It is generally accepted that the market for
secondary information about a public firm is tiered so that investors can
choose whether and to what extent to pay for information to reduce
uncertainty about securities pricing. Such secondary information sources
may range from a cheap newspaper to an expensive database containing
daily sales figures for certain products.232 However, it is less satisfactory
that firms themselves supply information to investors by employing a
tiered structure, even though the charge is levied by an intermediary.233
The problem is not the involvement of intermediaries in firms’
monetization of NPI, but the lack of transparency about the fact that NPI
is monetized and the extent of this activity in individual firms, as well as
the resulting unfairness if investors are unable to assess the criteria for
access to such events.234 The fact that particularly valuable information
may be disclosed in the setting of an unrehearsed private question-andanswer session and used by the recipient for trading suggests that
practices similar in effect to those that precipitated the introduction of
Reg. FD are still possible. With a lack of transparency surrounding the
selection of participants in these events, private investor meetings are
equally capable of causing a loss of public confidence in the fairness of
securities markets as pre-Reg. FD practices were.235

231. See also text accompanying notes 216–217, supra, for further discussion of
how information may increasingly be exchanged in less public forums.
232. Cf. Peter Landers, Drug-Data Chasm Punishes Small Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2003, at C1 (claiming that subscribers to certain databases costing between
$25,000 and $50,000 per year were able to observe daily sales data for hepatitis C
medications and conclude ahead of other investors that Schering-Plough was losing
market share to Roche).
233. See supra text accompanying note 47 (acknowledging that firms release
additional information in private).
234. Cf. Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979) (discussing how
nontransparent advantages in access to information results in perceived unfairness).
235. See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,592 (outlining the SEC’s view of
how selective disclosure of material information to analysts or investors would lower
public confidence in the market).
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In summary, both the increasingly private dissemination of research
and the practices of corporate access demonstrate how regulatory
changes may have caused analysts to take a less visible, although
equally instrumental, role in disseminating valuable information. Similar
practices to those that caused the SEC to promulgate Reg. FD may still
be occurring, but in less public settings.
E. THE SECOND CIRCUIT FURTHER RAISES THE INSIDER TRADING
THRESHOLD
The concept of “personal benefit” is central to tipping cases. 236
Since a pecuniary gain is far-fetched in the private meeting situation, the
two types of personal benefits that could accrue are reputational benefits
and gifts.237
The Eleventh Circuit found a sufficient reputational benefit where
the tipper and tippee had “worked together for several years, and split
commissions on various real estate transactions.” 238 Elements
resembling both a gift of information and reputation enhancement were
present in SEC v. Sargent, where the First Circuit found the personal
benefit requirement fulfilled because the tipper used the tippee’s
network for business contacts and the tipper’s relatives owed the tippee
money and had also threatened his business.239 A purer gifting benefit
was established in SEC v. Maio, where the Seventh Circuit found that a
CEO and Chairman had improperly gifted NPI for a personal benefit by
establishing a history of gift-giving from the insider to the recipient and
a lack of a corporate purpose for the disclosure.240 While courts have
generally not found it particularly difficult to establish a reputational
236.
237.
238.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–80 (11th Cir. 2003). This was a
misappropriation case but the court established, following substantial analysis, that the
element that the tipper intended to benefit from her disclosure was the same as under
the classical theory.
239. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000). The court noted that
information could have been disclosed in order to “effect a reconciliation . . . and to
maintain a useful networking contact.”
240. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995). The court established that the tipper
had promised a mutual friend shortly before his death to “look after” the tippee and had
previously lent the tippee a significant amount of money without documentation. Id. at
627.
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benefit or a gift,241 the recent Second Circuit decision in United States v.
Newman appears to have increased the demands on the type of personal
benefits required to satisfy Dirks.
In Newman, two investment managers were accused of trading on
material NPI leaked by insiders at Dell and Nvidia. 242 As a result of
tipping chains, the actual traders were three and four levels removed
from the insider tippers. 243 The Second Circuit held that a tippee, in
order to be liable, needs to know that the insider tipper breached a duty
to keep the NPI confidential and that the tipper received a personal
benefit for the disclosure.244 The court also held that “the mere fact of a
friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature” was not enough to
show a personal benefit to satisfy the Dirks standard. 245 Rather, “a
meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that
is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” was required. 246 While noting
that this quid pro quo did not need to be “immediately pecuniary,” the
court emphasized that it “must be of some consequence.”247 The court
indicated what type of benefit it may have had in mind by distinguishing
United States v. Jiau,248 SEC v. Yun,249 and SEC v. Sargent250 from the
241. See U.S. v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The proof required to
show personal benefit to the tipper is modest.”); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 292 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“In light of the broad definition of personal benefit set forth in Dirks, this
bar is not a high one.”); Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280 (“The showing needed to prove an intent
to benefit is not extensive.”).
242. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
243. Id. at 443.
244. Id. at 450 (2d Cir. 2014).
245. Id. at 452. In an earlier ruling, the Second Circuit had found the personal
benefit requirement fulfilled where the tipper, a director of a firm subject to a takeover,
and the tippee were close friends. See SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1998).
246. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
247. Id.
248. For one tipper the benefits received included “an iPhone, live lobsters, a gift
card, and a jar of honey,” and for another it consisted of an invitation to join an
investment club. See Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153.
249. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit mischaracterized the relevant relationship in
Sargent, stating that the “tipper passed information to a friend who referred others to
the tipper for dental work,” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452-53, when it was the tipper
(Shepard) who referred others to the tippee (Sargent) for dental work. The Sargent
tippee provided the tipper with contacts and networking opportunities, and relatives of
the tipper owed the tippee money and had threatened his business. The court held that
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case at hand. In Newman, career advice provided by one selective
disclosure recipient to an alleged insider tipper was deemed to be only
what could be expected from a casual acquaintance, and the fact that
another recipient knew his alleged tipper from church did not suffice to
meet the Dirks standard. For an investor who does not meet
management regularly enough to establish a meaningfully close
relationship and does not provide, or could objectively be deemed to
provide, any consequential personal benefit to the manager, Newman
appears to have reduced the risk of incurring securities fraud liability for
trading on privately received material NPI.
Important evidence in favor of the Newman defendants showed that
Dell and Nvidia regularly disclosed apparently value-relevant NPI in
private forums to analysts and investors.251 A supervisor of one of the
insider tippers testified that investor relations departments often helped
analysts improve their financial valuation models. 252 The head of
investor relations in one of the firms had also privately indicated the
likely outcome of operating expenses and certain margins in an
upcoming quarterly report.253 The court noted that the corporate purpose
of such disclosures appeared to be to build relationships with
professional investors who could be interested in buying the firm’s
stock.254 The fact that information similar to that which the defendants
had allegedly used for insider trading was regularly selectively disclosed
this sufficed to indicate that the tip had the purpose of “effect[ing] a reconciliation . . .
and maintain[ing] a useful networking contact.” Given that the Second Circuit appears
to have misunderstood the exchanges between tipper and tippee in Sargent, the court’s
apparent endorsement of the case may not have much precedential value. See generally
SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
251. Newman, 773 F.3d at 454–55.
252. Id. at 454. An analyst also testified that he would frequently ask public firms’
investor relations departments to confirm “whether his assumptions were ‘too high or
too low’ or in the ‘ball park.’” While the SEC considers it acceptable for firms under
Reg. FD to assist analysts with public historical data or mosaic construction, Newman
was a case where the government claimed material forward-looking information was
provided. For the SEC’s position, see the answer to Question 101.03 in SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, REGULATION FD COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE INTERPRETATIONS (2010),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regfd-interp.htm [https://perma.cc/V9U
D-7TEA].
253. Newman, 773 F.3d at 454–55.
254. Id. Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting the professed importance
of having investors available to buy stock).
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by investor relations personnel contributed to the court’s finding that the
defendants could not have known of an improper motive for such
information being privately available to them. 255 While the Newman
defendants were part of tipping chains and several steps removed from
the disclosing insiders, the court’s analysis could have some relevance
to direct tipper-tippee interactions as well. For example, where
managers regularly disclose certain information in private to investors
who do not provide any direct personal benefits in return, investors may
be afforded some additional margin in concluding that such disclosures
are not improper. Since investor relations activities such as private
meetings or telephone calls with investors are undertaken in the interests
of the firm, there would typically not be an obvious personal benefit to
the manager.
Interestingly, the source for the Dell information, who worked in its
investor relations department, was never charged with any
wrongdoing. 256 Thus, the selective disclosure concerning Dell did not
lead to any charges being brought successfully, even though the ultimate
recipients earned approximately $62 million.257 The fact that information
of such a magnitude may be disclosed without any consequences for the
tipper is unexpected,258 and suggests that insiders may now be able to
confer significant value on selected recipients without SEC
255.
256.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 455.
The source for the Nvidia information worked in its finance department and
paid $30,000 to settle civil charges, not facing other charges. See Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Technology Company Insider in California With Tipping
Confidential Information Exploited by Hedge Funds (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541624596 [https://
perma.cc/C3N7-3WKJ]. As regards the status of the Dell insider tipper, see Newman,
773 F.3d at 443.
257. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Two Former Portfolio Managers
Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court of Insider Trading Schemes That Netted
More Than $72 Million in Illegal Profits (Dec. 17, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/two-former-portfolio-managers-found-guilty-inmanhattan-federal-court-of-insider-trading-schemes-that-netted-more-than-72-millionin-illegal-profits [https://perma.cc/Q53B-LHE6].
258. The Second Circuit appeared to find the situation where the tippees were
charged criminally but the insider tippers were not, noteworthy. See Newman, 773 F.3d
at 443, where the court pointed out that “[a]lthough [the Dell insider] has yet to be
charged administratively, civilly, or criminally . . . for insider trading or any other
wrongdoing, the Government charged that [the investment managers who traded] were
criminally liable for insider trading.”
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enforcement. The reason why the SEC did not take any Reg. FD action
is likely due to the regulation’s interaction with insider trading law. As
Reg. FD does not apply to disclosures by an insider “in breach of a duty
of trust or confidence to the issuer,”259 the SEC could not enforce its
regulation without admitting that the disclosure was for a legitimate
corporate purpose. As the SEC was supporting the efforts by the
Department of Justice to have Newman overturned,260 it thus appears to
have refrained from enforcing Reg. FD for policy reasons.261
A comparison of Newman and the recent Supreme Court decision
in Salman v. United States262 highlights that a gift of information to a
relative (as in Salman) is relatively easy to define as a personal benefit
due to the obvious lack of corporate purpose, but selective disclosure to
others (as in Newman) requires an analysis of the relationship between
the tipper and the tippee to determine whether the reason for the tipper’s
selective disclosure was to benefit the firm or provide a gift to the tippee
with the ultimate aim of procuring some reciprocal personal benefit for
the insider.263
In conclusion, Newman may provide more flexibility for
disclosures in private investor meetings going forward due to its
requirement that the personal benefit be more than an inference of some
personal relationship, but also by potentially allowing firms’ prior
disclosure practices to be taken into account when evaluating the
tippee’s assessment of whether the disclosure was improper. Overall,
Newman may lead to an increase in demand for private meetings as the
259.
260.

17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2015).
See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition of the United
States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 11–12, Newman, 773 F.3d at 438 (No.
13-1837) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief]; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15,
Newman, 773 F.3d at 438 (discussing the Department of Justice’s argument that the
Second Circuit’s Newman decision would “impair the government’s ability to protect
the fairness and integrity of the securities markets”).
261. Similarly, there may be other policy reasons behind the decision to prosecute
the ultimate Dell tippees but not the Dell insider tipper, even though a successful
prosecution of the Dell tippees would have implied that the tipper could have been
found guilty as well. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (“[A]bsent a breach
by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”).
262. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
263. Against this background, it is not surprising that the Second Circuit analyzed
the personal relationships in Newman in significant detail, see Newman, 773 F.3d at
451-54 and supra text accompanying notes 246-247.
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ruling appears to result in a lower likelihood that an insider trading case
will be successful.
F. REG. FD: “FUNDAMENTALLY DISJOINTED”
The lack of a consequential personal benefit to the manager from
typical disclosures made to investors and analysts, as well as difficulties
in establishing scienter and materiality, means that the insider trading
framework is typically inapplicable for purposes of policing the subtle
breaches of the duty of loyalty that may occur in the selective disclosure
context.264
The SEC opted to tackle this issue based on its view that equality in
information distribution is an important contributor to the public’s
confidence in the markets. 265 It enacted Reg. FD to require prompt
public disclosure of information, but failed to anticipate how managers
and investors might adapt to the new regulation. As a result, the SEC—
eager to avoid a chilling effect on legitimate selective disclosures—
ensured that it would not have any strong enforcement tools on hand or
the ability to detect any but the most egregious violations. Consequently,
Reg. FD not only fails to deter selective disclosures but also provides a
roadmap for how managers can give preferred investors advance
information with little risk of liability. If Reg. FD today serves its
intended purpose of increasing investor confidence in the market, it is
only because information exchanges are more private, making investors
at large unaware of how easy it still is for managers to hand out
information to favored investors and analysts.
When the SEC enacted Reg. FD as an issuer disclosure obligation,
it chose as its aim to restrict supply of selective disclosure, not demand.
Against this background, it is surprising that the Newman case only
resulted in actions against the trading information recipients. One may
wonder if it would not have been easier for the SEC to contain selective
disclosure at its source, i.e., before it leaves the firm, instead of targeting
the point at which investors trade on it. In examining potential ways to
improve the regulation, however, it is useful to first consider selective
disclosure in context.
264. See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,592–93, and Adopting Release,
supra note 7, at 51,716–18, which both note how managers may use information to
“curry favor” with investors or gain biased reporting from analysts.
265. See, e.g., Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,593.
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III. INFORMATION AS PROPERTY, ITS DEPLOYMENT, AND THE RISK OF
APPROPRIATION
A. NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION AS PROPERTY OF THE FIRM
When the Supreme Court in Dirks required the receipt of a personal
benefit by a disclosing manager in order to trigger liability for selective
disclosure, it established a rule that considered selective disclosure
similar to dealing in firm property.266 Where the manager does not gain a
personal benefit, selective disclosure is treated much like any corporate
transaction and the tippee may freely monetize the acquired information
in the stock market. Where the manager does take some personal profit,
however, the transaction is actionable, broadly similar to how a
conflicted-interest transaction may be voidable in state corporate law. If
the information recipient knows about the manager’s profit (in the
typical example, by providing it), that person is also liable, effectively
aiding and abetting the manager’s breach of duty. The Supreme Court
has subsequently affirmed in the insider trading context that “[a]
company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as property to which
the company has a right of exclusive use.”267
The formulation of the personal benefit requirement in Dirks raised
the fundamental question of whether a firm’s selective disclosure of

266. Several commentators have related the insider trading framework to property
rights concepts in detailed analyses. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of
Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1980) (arguing, pre-Dirks, that
corporate NPI is the corporation’s property); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Regulating Insider Trading in the Post-Fiduciary Duty Era: Equal Access or Property
Rights?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 80, 96-97 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge ed., 2013) (arguing that a property rights approach is more suited as the
basis for current insider trading regulations than a securities fraud perspective);
JONATHAN MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY 56–58 (1991)
(arguing that the Supreme Court in Dirks noted the rationale behind the preservation of
property rights in valuable information, but also noted that a firm cannot have “a
legitimate property interest” in the information that it itself is committing fraud, which
is why the tipper was not in breach of his duty by informing Dirks. For further
references, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into
the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1252 n.266
(1995).
267. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
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material NPI for its own benefit could incur liability. 268 Several
commentators doubted that this could be the case, while others noted the
internal conflicts in the insider trading doctrine that would otherwise
result. 269 However, when viewing information as firm property it is
entirely logical that a firm may trade it for value.
The practical validity of the judiciary’s theoretical construct of
information as property is borne out by the actions of stock market
participants. As this Article has documented, firms use information as a
corporate resource 270 and sophisticated intermediaries have developed
special services to facilitate its transfer to investors that pay significant
amounts to receive it.271 Theory and practice consequently coincide in
the view that NPI is valuable firm property controlled by corporate
managers.
For public firms, the property right in its own confidential
information that it will later release to the stock market is an asset with
different attributes than other firm property, even other intangible
property. Unlike an invention that is patentable, such NPI is incidental
to the firm’s productive activities and can be immediately monetized in
the stock market. Consider two identical debt-free firms, one with
publicly traded stock currently worth $1.0 billion and the other privately
held. The CEO of each firm knows that the actual value of their firm is
actually $1.5 billion due to a significant contract win, which will be
disclosed to the market in a few days.272 In the case of the private firm,
this information is useless for a professional investor.273 Where it relates
to the public firm, it is incredibly valuable. The manager of the public
268. See the initial paragraphs supra Section II.B. For a substantial literature review
on this topic, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 323-335. See also Anderson et
al., supra note 126, at 279 (former SEC Commissioner Goldschmid outlining his postDirks, pre-Reg. FD view that firms would not have been allowed to trade their own
shares with material information but may have been able to selectively disclose such
information for a benefit to the firm due to the Supreme Court’s formulation of the
personal benefit requirement in Dirks).
269. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 323-335.
270. See supra text accompanying note 47.
271. See supra Sections I.D and II.D.2. For evidence of how managers use NPI
opportunistically, see infra Section III.C.
272. Form 8-K requires firms to file within four business days of the event. See 17
C.F.R. § 249.308 (2015).
273. One may, of course, imagine an oligopoly or other industry composition
scenario where the state of a private firm may predict the state of one or more public
firms. This is not considered here.
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firm can opt to confer this value on chosen recipients via selective
disclosure before its public disclosure.274
This begs the question of whether the public firm is worth more
than the private firm. After the disclosure of the contract win, the
productive assets of each firm are worth $1.5 billion. Before the
disclosure, however, the public firm is able to monetize the information
about its own true value in the stock market. Assume the public firm
provides this information to an information trader and receives
consideration worth $100 million for the trading advantage. 275 When
both firms later publicly disclose the contract win, is the public firm
then worth $1.6 billion while the private firm is worth $1.5 billion? And,
if so, where did this value come from? The value will come from
shareholders who sell their shares below the new fair market value to the
intermediary informed by the firm. The receipt of this value enables the
intermediary to, in turn, provide value to the firm. The value of the
public firm’s property right in NPI that will soon be released to the
public thus comes from its agreement to, in effect, issue a license to the
selected investor to transact with its uninformed shareholders at a
favorable price. In the example, the intermediary is buying the firm’s
equity from shareholders exiting the firm at a price below actual market
value. Had the information instead been negative, the intermediary
could sell the firm’s shares to shareholders entering the firm at a price
above actual market value. Firms are consequently able to use selective
disclosure to effectively raise equity from shareholders when they enter
and exit the firm in a way that is similar to imposing a transaction cost
on them via a chosen information trader.276

274. Intentional selective disclosure of such material NPI would be a breach of Reg.
FD but as outlined in the last paragraph of Section II.B, supra, the regulation can be
violated at low expected cost where a manager knows that the firm will disclose
valuable information in the near future.
275. The value to the firm is typically delivered in non-pecuniary form, such as
goodwill or loyalty. See supra Section I.C.1.
276. If the shareholders of the public firm are aware that the firm is monetizing
information in this way, it should face a higher cost of capital, however, since the bidask spread of the firm’s stock should reflect the risk of trading against the better
informed trader.
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B. A TAXONOMY OF METHODS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF INFORMATION
As the value of NPI comes from the ability to trade in the stock
market, it is useful to examine the various ways in which a firm may
cause this to occur, in order to place selective disclosure regulation in its
appropriate context. 277 Depending on who trades on the NPI, we can
distinguish between different methods for deployment. The choice of
deployment method largely rests with managers. This Article proposes
that a manager with access to value-relevant, firm-specific NPI has four
options for monetizing it by trading, or causing trading, in the firm’s
stock: personal trading, firm trading, selected investor trading, and
market trading. General attributes of these methods are set out below.
Selected
investor
trading
One
selected
investor

Market
trading

Personal
trading

Firm
trading

Person
trading

Manager

Firm

Method of
receiving
the NPI

Incidental
(through
employment)

Incidental
(through
manager)

Selective
disclosure
(chosen by
manager)

Public
disclosure

Relative
efficiency

Low

Low

Low

High

Trading
value to
recipient

High

High

High

Low

Market
(unknown)

Table 2. Methods for Deployment of Firm-Specific NPI278

277. The closest precedent found in the literature for this functional approach
considers three alternatives for use of information, but not selective disclosure. See
Andrea M. Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, Should Insider Trading Be Prohibited when
Share Repurchases Are Allowed?, 12 REV. FIN. 735 (2008).
278. While Figure 2 shows that the attributes of selective disclosure vary depending
on the number of initial recipients, the example here only reviews such a disclosure to a
single investor. The last two rows of the table follow from Figure 2.

104

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

The methods in Table 2 all ultimately result in information reaching
the market through stock prices, but with different degrees of relative
efficiency. The first three methods are of a private nature and involve
direct monetization of the property by trading against uninformed
investors. Public disclosure, in contrast, results in immediate public
knowledge and only indirect monetization through the market price. The
private methods are non-exclusive, while public disclosure extinguishes
the opportunity to monetize information through the private methods.
C. THE RISK AND EVIDENCE OF MANAGERIAL APPROPRIATION
Due to the separation of ownership and control in public firms,
managers will have an incentive to divert value to themselves instead of
distributing it to shareholders.279 Value-relevant NPI is a highly suitable
asset for appropriation by managers for several reasons. First, managers
acquire NPI about their firms by virtue of their position, typically
without personal cost. 280 Second, NPI is not recorded on the firm’s
balance sheet or otherwise, so it is impossible to monitor its use. This
also means that the firm is not visibly affected, or harmed, by the
selective disclosure. Third, it is impossible for firms to create a system
to monitor managers to determine whether they selectively disclose
valuable NPI in private discussions. Fourth, other market participants
and shareholders are not necessarily aware that private disclosure has
taken place and certainly not aware of what particular information has
been shared. 281 Fifth, private meetings where NPI is disclosed appear
legitimate even when they are not, since they are assumed to be in the

279. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
280. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 22, at 507–08. To the extent any outlay is
necessary to acquire particular information, corporate funds can likely be spent. See
Hirshleifer supra note 65, at 35.
281. Even if other investors were aware, they could be disinclined to call attention to
the practice, since they may also systematically benefit from it. This means that such
“informal private enforcement” is unlikely. Cf. John Armour, Enforcement Strategies in
UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment, in RATIONALITY IN
COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DD PRENTICE 71, 102-118 (John Armour &
Jennifer Payne eds., 2009) (outlining how informal private enforcement may work, but
not when other institutional investors may be conflicted).
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interest of the firm.282 Sixth, neither the manager nor the recipient has
anything to gain from publicizing the fact that a transfer of valuable NPI
has occurred. Finally, the recipient monetizes the NPI by anonymous
trading in the stock market which typically cannot be decoded. 283 In
sum, it is currently very difficult to discern to what extent a manager
may have selectively disclosed NPI.
Not even the disclosing manager will know the exact value of the
benefit conferred on the selective disclosure recipient. 284 Since
information does not have an assigned value within the firm, and since
its value is realized on the shareholder level with no visible impact on
the firm level, attention may be deflected away from the size of the
value transfers that occur. In absolute terms, managers may reallocate
highly significant sums of money among investors when they opt for
selective disclosure over alternative uses of information.285
Managers may act in two ways to increase the value of the
information property that they control. First, they can delay public
disclosure for as long as possible in order to have more time to utilize
the information. While Form 8-K requires disclosure of certain events
within four business days, other events may not have to be disclosed
until the next periodic report. 286 Second, managers may prefer public
disclosure to be convoluted and fragmented so that they can maintain
control over as much information as possible, making investors
dependent on them to be able to fully interpret the public disclosure.287
This creates a risk that the public disclosure becomes formalistic in
order to achieve superficial compliance with reporting requirements but
still leaves out valuable details necessary to fully understand it.288 The
282. See GUIMARD¸ supra note 30, at 97–103 (noting selective activities to attract
shareholders); id. at 168-70 (noting how “analyst days” or “capital market days” serve
to educate analysts).
283. See supra Section I.C.3.a.
284. From another perspective, the fact that NPI does not have a value within the
firm may allow managers to feign ignorance of the values they distribute.
285. See supra Section II.C.
286. See supra note 6.
287. The observation that 43% of analyst interactions occur after firm-initiated news
releases may be an indication that public disclosure is incomplete from the perspective
of professional financial analysts. See Soltes, supra note 39, at 257.
288. See Michael Rapoport, Five Years Later, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R8
(citing concerns that publicly disclosed information was “dumbed down” following the
introduction of Reg. FD). See also JOHN HOLLAND, A MODEL OF CORPORATE
FINANCIAL COMMUNICATIONS (2006), a UK study of disclosure which documented how
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SEC appears to have recognized the risk of delay289 but not the risk of
convolution or fragmentation. While the SEC took care to ensure that
Reg. FD would not have a defensive “chilling” effect—which would
cause managers to stop talking to investors to avoid incurring
liability 290 —it did not appear to recognize this opposite risk of
“offensive chilling” of public disclosures, where firms reduce the quality
of their public disclosures to be able to monetize it via private
deployment methods.291
There is evidence that managers time their firms’ news releases to
increase their own option awards and to transact in the firm’s shares in
favorable market conditions. 292 There is also evidence that managers
trade profitably in the period between the occurrence of an important

managers deliberately did not include complete information in their public disclosure in
order to be able to explain it in private and maintain control over information as a
corporate resource. By having some public disclosure on the topic, albeit fragmented,
managers considered the public disclosure obligations satisfied, which allowed them to
draw attention to and elaborate on particular items in private, partly for purposes of
managerial opportunism.
289. See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 72,592.
290. See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,718.
291. Cf. Mark Maffett, Financial Reporting Opacity and Informed Trading by
International Institutional Investors, 54 J. ACCT. ECON. 201 (finding that “firms with
more opaque information environments . . . experience more privately informed
trading”); John L. Campbell et al., supra note 147 (finding that selective disclosure is
more common in firms that have weaker information environments).
292. See Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the
Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. ECON. 296, 306 (2010); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G.
Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A
Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. ECON. 405, 422 (2001);
Alex Edmans, Luis Goncalves-Pinto, Yanbo Wang & Moqi Xu, Strategic News
Releases in Equity Vesting Months (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 440/2014,
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2489152 [http://perma.cc/6JDC-9QZ5] (suggesting that
“managers strategically time the disclosure of discretionary corporate news to coincide
with the scheduled vesting of their equity grants . . . lead[ing] to temporary increases in
the stock price and trading volume”); Eliezer M. Fich, Robert Parrino & Anh L. Tran,
Timing Stock Trades for Personal Gain: Private Information and Sales of Shares by
CEOs (Working Paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2579047 [http://perma.cc/TQ7S
-D243] (presenting evidence that managers time their firms’ disclosures to maximize
trading profits from so-called 10b5-1 plans; also listing many previous studies that
show that managers use private information for profitable trading).
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event in their firms and the official disclosure of that event. 293
Opportunistic managerial use of NPI in voluntary private disclosures to
financial analysts has also been a long-standing concern of regulators.294
While the SEC intended to restrict such behavior with the introduction
of Reg. FD, evidence suggests that managers still engage in similar
practices, cutting off the supply of selective disclosure to analysts who
produce unfavorable research. 295 Managers also give analysts with
positive views of their firms the right to ask questions on public earnings
calls.296 As a result, analysts pay more attention to corporate managers’
perception of them than investors’ assessments of them.297
While NIRI’s official position cautions issuers not to
“[d]iscriminate among recipients of information . . . based on the
recipient’s prior research,”298 a recent article in its official magazine coauthored by one of its board members299 declared that a broker with a
“sell” rating on a firm should reduce its expectations of being awarded
other business and “be careful about third-party conversations, because
the buy side will share [the broker’s] comments with management.”300
Even senior investor relations professionals may thus harbor conflicted
views on whether NPI may be used to reward or deter stakeholder
behavior.

293. Alma Cohen, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, The 8-K Trading Gap
(Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia University Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
524, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657877 [http://perma.cc/LG2N-HV2V].
294. See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,717. The UK authority has made
similar observations. See Fin. Servs. Auth., Investment Research: Conflicts and Other
Issues §§ 4.24–26 (Discussion Paper No. 15, 2002).
295. Brown et al., supra note 31, at 28, 37 (surveying 365 sell-side analysts and
finding that nearly half of them regarded their relationship with managers to be an
important factor for their compensation). Analysts also stated that without positive
stock recommendations issuers would not attend their conferences, thus depriving them
of the opportunity to earn corporate access fees. Id. For earlier evidence, see Jill E.
Fisch & Hillary E. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of
Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1054-56 (2003).
296. See William J. Mayew, Evidence of Management Discrimination Among
Analysts During Earnings Conference Calls, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 627 (2008).
297. See Brown et al., supra note 31, at 37.
298. CFA CENTRE FOR MARKET INTEGRITY & NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., BEST
PRACTICE GUIDELINES GOVERNING ANALYST/CORPORATE ISSUER RELATIONS 4 (2004).
299. See NIRI 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29.
300. Bob Burton & Jeff Tryka, IRO’s Wish List for Analysts, IR UPDATE, May 2012,
at 7, 9.
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Opportunistic use of NPI by managers is consequently welldocumented across the spectrum of the methods for information
deployment. Although the SEC appeared to focus on how managers’
control of information could lead to analyst conflicts of interest (as they
would try to maintain profitable access by pleasing the managers with
favorable research), active investors are equally dependent on
management access. The nature of active investing means that such
investors are reliant on NPI—information not incorporated into market
prices—in order to outperform their benchmarks and stay in business
over the long term. While disclosure to analysts may lead to more
publicity, it is no less likely that managers use private meetings to also
reward or deter investor behavior.
An important reason for firms to take part in private investor
meetings is to convince investors to become shareholders, 301 so
managers may be able to influence the profile of shareholders who take
or maintain a stake in the firm by granting one or more investors NPI
and withholding it from others. Through such investor discrimination,
managers can reduce their risk of attracting hostile shareholder action.
For example, a manager may prefer a shareholder that is passive or
strongly supportive of the firm’s current strategy to one that is less
cooperative, providing the former with useful NPI and withholding it
from the latter.302
Discriminative behavior could also occur with investors who are
already shareholders of the firm. Managers may use NPI to reward those
shareholders who offer them tacit support by voting for their proxy
proposals or compensation and withhold NPI from investors who
challenge their views. 303 Managers may also award NPI with an
expectation or hope of such future action. 304 Similarly, investors may
301.
302.

See supra Section I.C.1.
The investor relations literature acknowledges that managers may be inclined
to favor certain investors. See MARCUS, supra note 30, at 27 (recognizing such
tendencies); see also GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 161 (recommending that investor
relations officers should attend private meetings to “avoid the CEO or CFO giving
(intentionally or unintentionally) price-sensitive information”) (emphasis added).
303. Cf. Coffee, supra note 122 (arguing that selective disclosures could be used by
managers to buy votes).
304. Even in situations where awards of material NPI result in a personal benefit to
the manager at a later point in time, it would be very difficult to prove that such a
benefit was sufficiently consequentially related to the selective disclosure event to
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indicate that they will support a manager if they are provided with useful
NPI. 305 As the favored investors in such cases reciprocate by
participating in ostensibly legitimate corporate actions that serve to
compensate managers via the firm, there are no signs of personal
benefits to managers.
Empirical evidence shows that institutional investors have access to
corporate NPI and trade profitably on it. For example, institutional
investors have been found to systematically trade in advance of news
about unexpected firm-specific events, such as earnings announcement
surprises.306 Furthermore, mutual fund managers who share educational
ties with corporate managers overweight and outperform in such
investments, with nearly all of the outperformance occurring around
corporate news announcements.307 Such mutual fund managers are not
only able to make more profitable trades, but are also “more likely to
vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive
compensation.” 308 This finding is consistent with a scenario where
certain active investors receive better information from managers they
know and reciprocate by supporting their contentious pay packages.309
Providing personal benefits to managers via the firm through
shareholder voting in this way may be the easiest and least obvious way
for investors to reciprocate while superficially complying with Dirks’
personal benefit requirement. The absence of consequential benefits to
managers from subtle investor discrimination makes it highly unlikely
trigger insider trading law. Furthermore, it is currently impossible to monitor for such
events, as the disclosure itself is unobservable. With no potential for monitoring, there
is likely little deterrence created.
305. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 1042 (making a similar argument for
analysts).
306. Terrence Hendershott, Dmitry Livdan & Norman Schürhoff, Are Institutions
Informed About News?, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 249 (2015).
307. Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, The Small World of
Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns, 116 J. POL. ECON. 951 (2008).
308. Alexander W. Butler & Umit G. Gurun, Educational Networks, Mutual Fund
Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2533 (2012).
309. Id. This study also found that “higher levels of the CEO compensation are
associated with a larger likelihood of a shareholder-initiated proposal to limit executive
compensation,” but only for firms with stronger educational connections between
managers and mutual fund managers. This is consistent with the view that such
managers’ compensation may include an element of private compensation from
connected investors that is objectively harder to justify, thereby causing shareholder
initiatives.
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that such actions would trigger the insider trading framework as
developed in Newman. This empirical evidence and the analysis of Reg.
FD suggest, as does the principle of parsimony, that selective disclosure
by managers is a plausible source for active investors’ information
advantages.310
D. COMPARING THE METHODS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF INFORMATION
It is important to place the regulation of selective disclosure in
private investor meetings in the correct context. This Article considers
the appropriate context to be the different methods available to corporate
managers for deployment of their firms’ NPI. Ideally, these different
alternatives should be coherently regulated to avoid exploitable
inconsistencies. Without coherence, managers in control of the corporate
property may find that certain methods offer better possibilities for
opportunistic actions. The remainder of this section will compare
selective disclosure to the other methods for deployment of information
identified in Section III.B.
1. Selective Disclosure Compared to Public Disclosure
The choice between public and selective disclosure involves a
trade-off from the perspective of the value conferred on the recipients: if
the manager chooses broad public disclosure, it may benefit investors
generally but no individual shareholder (or investor), but if selective
disclosure instead is preferred, value may be bestowed on the selected
recipient. Thus, managers exercise discretion over whether a piece of
NPI should be turned into a public good through broad dissemination or
a private good through selective disclosure.
Firm benefits of public disclosure may include reduced managerial
agency costs and enhancement of price accuracy, which increases
allocative efficiency, improves liquidity, and decreases share price

310. Brokers, for example, have been found not to be transmitting valuable NPI for
client trading. See John M. Griffin, Tao Shu & Selim Topaloglu, Examining the Dark
Side of Financial Markets: Do Institutions Trade on Information from Investment Bank
Connections?, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2155 (2012).

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

111

volatility and the cost of capital.311 Costs of public disclosure include
preparation costs, risk of weakening the firm’s competitive position, and
increased risk of liability.312 While reviews of the empirical disclosure
literature have catalogued much research in the area of voluntary public
disclosure (i.e., increased information in public reports), there is little
research in the field of voluntary private (i.e., “selective”) disclosure.313
Healy and Palepu surveyed empirical research to identify different
motives for voluntary public disclosure in the literature and found
varying degrees of support for the hypotheses that voluntary disclosure
increases in firms that expect to issue public debt or equity, firms
subject to corporate control contests, and firms where managers are
compensated more in stock, wish to trade in the stock or affect the share
price in their favor prior to stock option awards.314 At least the last two
of these findings appear explainable on the basis of managerial agency
costs. Graham et al. surveyed more than 400 executives of public firms
on their voluntary disclosure decisions, although without distinguishing
between voluntary public and voluntary private disclosures, and found
that firms make voluntary disclosures to “promote a reputation for
transparent reporting,” “reduce the information risk,” and “address the
deficiencies of mandatory reporting.” 315 This survey also found that
voluntary disclosure was constrained by managers’ fears of establishing
311. Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta, Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL REGULATION 511 (Niamh Moloney et al.
eds., 2015).
312. Id.
313. Healy & Palepu, supra note 292, at 427 (2001) (noting that private voluntary
disclosure has typically not been included in prior studies of voluntary disclosure).
Another review of theoretical and empirical work on disclosure did not note any
theoretical work on the topic of selective disclosure. See Christian Leuz & Peter
Wysocki, The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence
and Suggestions for Future Research, 54 J. ACCT. RES. 525 (2016). A third notes that
one of the main outstanding questions in the disclosure literature concerns the costs and
benefits of voluntary disclosure. See Beyer et al., supra note 292, at 298, 314
(encouraging researchers to recognize the changing regulatory landscape).
314. The authors found only weak support for the hypothesis that firms voluntarily
disclose to avoid litigation, no support either for or against the hypothesis that talented
managers will voluntarily disclose to reveal their skill, and some support for the
hypothesis that firms’ disclosure policies are affected by their competitive position.
Healy & Palepu, supra note 292, at 420–25.
315. John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. ECON. 3, 53-65 (2005).
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a pattern of disclosure which may not be sustainable in the long-term,
disclosing proprietary information to the detriment of their firms, and
drawing unwanted scrutiny.316
While firm benefits of selective disclosure are significantly less
explored in the literature, the motives for private investor meetings317
likely comprise the most important rationales for selective disclosure as
well. As noted, these reasons involve monetization of NPI for intangible
value such as loyalty and goodwill. 318 This means that selective
disclosure is essentially different from broad public disclosure.
Anecdotal evidence shows that both investors and managers may
prefer not to make NPI a public good. 319 An investment manager
reported in a recent investor letter that it had been watching a firm’s
invitation-only investor day via a public webcast in order to gauge
management’s response to newspaper allegations about overstated sales
figures only to learn after the event that they had answered such
sensitive questions during a break. 320 Similarly, firms now often
supplement the practice of having public earnings conference calls by
individually calling analysts after such calls.321 When firms choose to
provide such private forums to investors and analysts, we should expect
investors to utilize them as much and as far as firms allow, since
information is more valuable in private.322
To be sure, information exchanges between investors and managers
may often require a private setting. Managers may be reluctant to
subject themselves to tough questioning in public as unexpected
questions may produce answers that differ from the view they would

316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
See supra Section I.C.1.
See supra Section I.C.1.
Cf. HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 64-65 (1966)
(arguing that managers should not be expected to readily surrender a valuable
informational asset when some form of exchange is possible). But see infra note 333.
320. Letter from Greenlight Capital to Partners 4 (Oct. 15, 2013) (on file with
author).
321. Brown et al., supra note 31, at 19.
322. Cf. id. at 20 (quoting an analyst stating that he does not ask questions on the
public conference calls, as any useful information resulting from such would be shared
with all participants).
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otherwise carefully project.323 Similarly, investors would not undertake
the activity if the results were instantly available to other market
participants, since they would be unable to use the information for
profitable trading to cover their acquisition costs. Furthermore, some
information that investors gather in private meetings cannot possibly be
publicly disclosed. This is the case for subtle pieces of information, such
as managers’ body language, tone, and cautiousness in answering
questions, which may be useful to observe for monitoring or verification
purposes.324
It is, of course, impossible to draw any general conclusion as to
whether information disclosed in private would imply net benefits or net
costs to a firm if it had been publicly disclosed instead.325 The same is
true for firms’ monetization of NPI before its public release. All we can
say with certainty is that when a firm creates an information asymmetry
among investors through selective disclosure, it enables the recipients to
reallocate value from uninformed investors to themselves through
trading in the stock market. This is an activity with net negative social
value as the trading among investors is a zero-sum game with added
search and trading costs for investors and supply costs for the firm.326
There is also a further cost of information asymmetry, since market
makers and investors will adapt their bid-ask quotes to account for the
risk of trading against an informed trader.327 For selective disclosures to
be a socially useful activity, the sum of these costs would need to be
outweighed by benefits to the firm328 or investors.329
323. Cf. Soltes, supra note 39, at 265 (quoting a research director saying that in the
interest of maintaining access to senior management, it is important for analysts not to
pressure them with challenging questions on public conference calls).
324. See, e.g., Ng & Troianovski, supra note 4 (describing how a manager’s
unwillingness to elaborate in private on the firm’s need to raise capital was correctly
interpreted as a negative sign by meeting attendants, causing the share price to decline
15% before the firm announced an equity offering).
325. Furthermore, tacit information imparted in such meetings could not be publicly
disclosed, and it would be fruitless to attempt to distinguish explicit statements from
tacit information for purposes of regulating them differently.
326. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971), for the argument that
private, but not social, foreknowledge of circumstances that will eventually be disclosed
is valuable.
327. See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,731; Kraakman, supra note 22, at 49.
328. See supra Section I.C.1.
329. See supra Section I.C.3.
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Regardless of the benefits of selective disclosures to investors
collectively, the significant private value available to investors who
successfully acquire or find such information will entice them to engage
in the activity. The availability of selective disclosure could thus lead to
a collective action problem: investors who know that they can receive
information privately may not compel firms to improve their public
disclosures, since private information is more valuable to them. Active
investors may all seek to receive selective disclosures based on the
belief that they are able to produce superior returns, even though the
business model of active investment means that they, on average, do
not.330 Many active investors may then seek to have private meetings
with managers, potentially using more of firms’ (and their own)
resources than if the information was broadly disclosed. This collective
action problem may even lead investors with management access to
prefer less and less useful public disclosure, in order to be able to gain
more from private meetings. As a result, investors as a collective could
be worse off than if they had been able to agree to have managers
publicly disclose as much information as possible. In particular,
shareholders without access to private meetings may lose twice: both
when trading against more informed investors and when the firm spends
its resources to help those investors gain trading advantages against
them.
The value of public disclosure to managers comes from their share
of the general shareholder benefits and their private benefits of public
disclosure.331 A cost, possibly to both the firm and the manager, will be
that the potentially valuable option to monetize the information via
selective disclosure is extinguished when it is publicly disclosed.
Managers’ personal costs of public disclosure may include time spent
preparing or overseeing the disclosure, which may have to be provided
on an ongoing basis since disclosure on a topic, once initiated, creates
market expectations of similar disclosure in the future. 332 Given that
managers tend to own minority stakes in their firms, voluntary public
330. See Kenneth R. French, Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing, 43
J. FIN. 1537, 1561-62 (2008).
331. This could include the maximization of incentive compensation through
disclosure timing or signaling of management talent. See Healy & Palepu, supra note
292, at 422, 424; supra text accompanying note 292.
332. See supra text accompanying note 316.
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disclosure could in many cases produce net personal benefits in the form
of private benefits, but often produce net personal costs. It is therefore
unlikely that voluntary public disclosure would be a default choice for
managers.333
2. Selective Disclosure Compared to Insider Trading
Selective disclosure could be a substitute for insider trading.
Instead of trading personally, managers could grant the right to trade to
outsiders who provide some other benefit in return. 334 As we have
seen, 335 insider trading doctrine recognizes this problem and prohibits
selective disclosure if the manager takes a personal benefit.
Insider trading is the most direct route for a manager to use NPI to
signal confidence in the firm: an action which may benefit the manager
if and when the market interprets the signal to increase the value of her
shares or when the value-relevant NPI otherwise materializes in public
disclosures at a later point in time. There are, however, many reasons
why personal trading often may not be an attractive or available option:
managers may simultaneously be in possession of material NPI which
would make trading unlawful; they may not wish to engage in trading
too frequently because they have to publicly report it,336 which would
attract attention from the regulator and the media; managers may
consider themselves too undiversified to further pool their financial
capital with their human capital in the firm; they may consider the firm’s
share price to be subject to other short-term risks which they are unable
333. Some commentators appear, however, to be taking the contrary view: that
voluntary public disclosure would be the default choice for managers. See Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 723, 739 (2006) (arguing that competition among information traders
(defined as not having access to inside information) incentivizes managers to make
disclosures beyond the level set by mandatory disclosure regulation to the benefit of all
investors); Langevoort, supra note 78, at 1028-29 (suggesting that capital markets
benefits such as a lower cost of capital may predispose firms to public disclosure).
However, neither article seeks to conduct a review of the relative appeal of the various
possible uses of corporate information.
334. Cf. David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider
Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1986) (“[W]hen insiders cannot trade,
something of exactly the same form as the banned insider trading will still occur, but
the set of beneficiaries is altered.”).
335. See supra Section II.A.
336. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
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to efficiently hedge; and managers may due to other trading find
themselves in a situation requiring disgorgement of short-swing profits
if they were to trade.337 Firms may also establish policies of “blackout”
or “quiet” periods to ensure that managers do not trade or speak to
investors at certain times when they are particularly likely to possess
material NPI (such as before the release of a quarterly report). 338
However, while 98% of firms in a 2010 survey had instituted blackout
periods, only 82% also employed quiet periods,339 meaning that in some
firms managers were unable to trade but could still speak to investors.
More curiously, 79% of firms still participated in private calls or
meetings during their quiet periods,340 meaning that they are not actually
quiet at all.
This shows a clear contrast between managers’ trading and their
selective disclosures to outsiders who trade. Under both securities
regulation and the typical firm-imposed requirements, managers are
significantly more constrained and monitored in their own trading than
if they disclose to an outside investor who trades. Information recipients
are only subject to reporting if they cross the 5% ownership threshold
under the regime for notification of major holdings. 341 If managers
possess material NPI, they have a further preference for selective
disclosure as their personal trading would be unlawful. As
demonstrated, if such NPI is disclosed to an outsider without a personal
benefit, all that is required (if the manager labels the disclosure nonintentional) is eventual public disclosure of the information under Reg.
FD.342 Managers may thus rationally prefer to monetize the information
through selective disclosure. In doing so, managers would be expected
337.
338.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
As defined in a 2010 NIRI survey of investor relations practices, a “blackout
period” is “a specific period of time when the company’s officers, executives and
certain employees are prohibited from trading in the company’s stock,” while a “quiet
period” is “a period during which the officers of a company will not talk about the
company’s financials.” See NAT’L INV’R RELATIONS INST., TRADING BLACKOUT AND
QUIET PERIODS: SURVEY RESULTS (2010).
339. Id.
340. Id. The survey conclusions aptly note that “trading blackout periods tend to be
more formal and codified” while “quiet periods are much more art than science.” NIRI
Survey Sheds Light on Trading Blackout and Quiet Period Practices, NIRI EXECUTIVE ALERT (Mar. 24, 2010) (on file with author).
341. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012).
342. See supra Section II.B.
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to consider the available firm benefits from selective disclosure of the
information, 343 their personal benefits from selective disclosure,344 and
their personal cost, which would mainly be the time spent on such
private disclosures.
The value of insider transaction reporting obligations is twofold:
they serve notice of trading by managers based on potentially valuerelevant NPI, and they deter trading on material information. The fact
that insiders have a blanket obligation to report their trades, while
outsiders who receive information from them do not, could add to the
popularity of private investor meetings. Opportunistic managers may
prefer selective disclosure over personal trading due to the lack of
transparency.
3. Selective Disclosure Compared to Firm Trading
The effect of selective disclosure to an investor who uses the firm’s
NPI to conduct profitable trading and compensates the firm for the
information received is that the firm raises equity indirectly.345 This is
because the value the firm receives in return comes from the
intermediary’s profitable transactions in the firm’s stock with
uninformed shareholders. Firms can of course freely monetize valuerelevant, but non-material, 346 information through selective disclosure.
Furthermore, although a monetization of material NPI would be
intentional and consequently a violation of Reg. FD, some firms may
consider it a project with a positive expected value given that both the
risk of detection and the penalties assessed by the SEC in these cases are
low.347

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra Sections I.C.1 and I.C.3.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section I.A.
Seen as equity raisings, Schering-Plough may have raised over $67 million at a
realized regulatory cost of $1.05 million (assuming it received the same value as the
recipients earned), see Schering-Plough Release, supra note 179; text accompanying
notes 201–203, while Dell raised $62 million without any regulatory cost on the same
assumption, see supra note 257 and accompanying text. The information trader
assisting the firm in monetizing the information would not be violating the insider
trading framework as interpreted by leading SEC officials. See supra notes 127–128
and accompanying text.
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Firms deploying their NPI to trade their own stock—using, for
example, share repurchases or at-the-market offerings—can achieve a
result similar to that of a selective disclosure transaction as outlined
above. However, such transactions are, in contrast to selective
disclosure, subject to the antifraud rules of the securities laws, which
means that material NPI must be disclosed before any such trading takes
place.348 While neither repurchases nor at-the-market offerings require
more than summarized disclosure in the next quarterly report,349 this is
still more transparent than selective disclosure, which offers complete
secrecy and thus lower transaction costs.
From a manager’s perspective, the choice whether to deploy
information through selective disclosure or firm trading would likely
depend on personal preferences for the factors outlined above, but she
would share in the firm benefits from either method proportionally to
her level of firm ownership.
4. Concluding Remarks on Deployment Methods
The analysis above indicates that selective disclosure is so different
to public disclosure that the methods are best considered
complementary. Selective disclosure is more similar to the other private
methods for deployment of information and may be a substitute for
insider trading and, to a lesser extent, firm trading. A summarizing
comparison of the methods for deployment of information with a focus
on monitoring and deterrence is set out in Table 3.

348. See, e.g., James D. Small III, W. Clayton Johnson & Leslie N. Silverman, The
Resurgence of United States at-the-market Equity Offerings to Raise Capital in Volatile
Equity Markets, 4 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 290 (2009); ADAM FLEISHER, JOON HUR & JESSE
BRUSH, ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL SECURITIES OFFERINGS (2013), https://www.
clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/alternatives-to-traditionalsecurities-offerings.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5ZL-D5UX]. The topic of firms trading their
own stock while possessing value-relevant NPI has been analyzed by Fried, supra note
22, who proposes that firms should be subject to similar disclosure obligations as
insiders when they trade their own stock. Fried also presents a more detailed overview
of the disclosure rules applicable to firm trading than is possible in this Article.
349. Fried, supra note 22, at 814-15, 823-24; Small et al., supra note 348, at 302.

2017]

PRIVATE INVESTOR MEETINGS IN PUBLIC FIRMS

119

Personal
trading

Firm
trading

Selected
investor
trading

Market
trading

Disclosure
type

Incidental

Incidental

Selective
disclosure

Public
disclosure

Antifraud
rules
applicable?

Yes

Yes

No350

Yes

Internal firm
monitoring?

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No (only
consolidated
quarterly
data)

No

Yes

Market
monitoring
(through
disclosure)?

Table 3. Anti-Fraud Applicability and Available Monitoring Methods

Analyzing the ability to monitor the different ways in which firms
may cause informed trading in their stock, selective disclosure involves
the least oversight and the most risk of managerial value appropriation.
This is due to the inapplicability of the antifraud framework within the
realm of Reg. FD (which allows for investor discrimination without
consequential personal benefits to the manager) and the inability for
anyone to monitor the disclosure event or the recipient’s trading in the
market.
Another interesting finding in the analysis above is that the value of
the three private methods of disclosure will be higher if the quality of
public disclosure is lower. A manager seeking to maximize the value of
NPI for purposes of engaging in any of the three private deployment
methods may thus prefer to have public disclosure of a lower quality.
The “pecking order” for a manager seeking to deploy information
will likely depend on her level of ownership in the firm (as this
350. For selective disclosure favoring certain investors or analysts without
consequential personal benefits to the manager, the SEC does not apply the antifraud
rules. Cf. supra Section II.B (outlining the SEC’s considerations in disapplying
antifraud liability in Reg. FD); supra Section II.E (discussing how the Dell insider in
Newman was never charged with any wrongdoing).
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determines the relative attraction of participating in firm benefits over
taking personal benefits) and the firm’s and the manager’s utility of
bonding with investors. Managers may be particularly inclined to prefer
selective disclosure in cases where their participation in firm benefits is
relatively small and their personal utility of bonding with investors is
comparatively large.
IV. RECONSIDERING SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE REGULATION
A. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AS A TRANSACTION
This Article has argued that Reg. FD does not currently work as
intended because it offers corporate managers significant opportunities
to provide material NPI to preferred investors. Although there have been
reports to suggest that SEC officials have recently expressed interest in
the details of private investor meetings,351 the regulator has not yet taken
any initiatives in this area. It may be suspected that calls for increased
shareholder engagement have made the SEC reluctant to intervene for
fear of being viewed as hampering shareholder engagement efforts.352
Viewing information as valuable property of the firm means that
selective disclosure can be considered an intermediated stock sale or
repurchase where the issuer provides the intermediary with a license to
use its NPI to transact in its stock and the intermediary provides some
value in return. 353 Selective disclosure is also inherently a conflictedinterest transaction, since a corporate manager selects investors upon
351. Charlie Gasparino, Regulators May Expand Definition of Insider Trading, FOX
BUSINESS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/02/15/regulator
s-may-expand-definition-insider-trading/ [http://perma.cc/CBL9-5F84] (noting that an
SEC official expressed concern over issuer practices of one-on-one meetings and
private calls in relation to Reg. FD); see also Kara Scannell, SEC Pushes for HedgeFund Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1190134
84429231164 [http://perma.cc/2F42-WCZW] (reporting that the SEC requested “a list
of all ‘one-on-one’ meetings arranged at conferences sponsored by brokerage firms”).
352. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Society of
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 69th National Conference:
Building Meaningful Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-and-enga
gement-with-shareholde.html [http://perma.cc/D9NM-RLJB]
353. While the function is an intervention in the market for the firm’s stock, this is
not observable to the manager; only the transaction with the intermediary is.
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which to bestow the firm’s valuable property, and these investors are in
turn able to influence the manager’s position when they elect directors
and vote on executive compensation. Importantly, the SEC already has
statutory authority to regulate both issuers’ transactions in their own
stock and conflicted-interest transactions.354
While the SEC has recently argued that general adoption of the
personal benefit test as articulated in Newman would interfere with its
ability to protect the “fairness and integrity of the securities markets,”355
this is not necessarily the case. The SEC could itself remedy the root
cause of Newman—disclosure by an employee of a public firm
ostensibly for the benefit of the firm itself—by better aligning its Reg.
FD with the Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine.
This Article proposes that the SEC should treat selective disclosure
as a special type of conflicted-interest transaction. As with related-party
transactions, participation in such can be beneficial to firms but these
transactions also involve a managerial conflict of interest.
In considering how to regulate selective disclosure as a transaction,
we should prefer a legal strategy that minimizes the risk that undesirable
transactions will occur while maximizing the opportunity for desirable
transactions to still take place, taking the costs of the various regulatory
strategies themselves into account. 356 Investors would consider
transactions where managers provide selected investors with valuable
information in return for insufficient consideration to the firm
undesirable, as they may be motivated by a wish to reward investors for
past behavior or encourage future behavior that is favorable to
managers.
In considering regulatory options, we can dispense with the
alternative to prohibit selective disclosures because it would be a blunt
method that would remove the potential benefits of private meetings.
Ensuring approval by directors or some independent contingent or
354. If the SEC had considered selective disclosures to be conflicted-interest
transactions when promulgating Reg. FD, it would perhaps have found it more suitable
to regulate it akin to its treatment of related-party transactions where disclosure
thresholds are based on absolute dollar amounts. Item 404 of Regulation S-K requires
disclosure of related-party transactions in excess of $120,000 where related persons
have a “direct or indirect material interest.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2015).
355. See SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 260, at 2.
356. Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World
Challenges (with a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 1, 13 (2015).
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committee thereof would be practically impossible, since there is no
way to actually review the information that will be or has been
selectively disclosed. The same goes for shareholder approval. This
Article will instead continue by considering how disclosure, one of the
most powerful corporate law tools for curbing expropriation by
managers,357 may be utilized.
B. DESIGNING AN APPROPRIATE REPORTING OBLIGATION
This Article has identified several weaknesses in the current Reg.
FD. In proposing improvements, the lack of information available to
shareholders about significant disclosure mistakes should first be
corrected. While Reg. FD encourages prompt public disclosure of the
selectively disclosed information itself where a firm disclosed it by
mistake, the lack of a requirement to report the fact that the firm made a
disclosure mistake could be abused to regularly supply favored investors
with material information without other shareholders being aware.358 To
remedy this problem, it is recommended that firms should be required to
file a Form 8-K following such mistakes, noting when the information
was originally disclosed and to whom. This new requirement would add
significantly to the deterrence function of Reg. FD, as shareholders
could then assess the quality of an individual firm’s selective disclosure
practices.359 Furthermore, as Reg. FD intended but curiously failed to
provide a mechanism for, 360 such a reporting requirement would also
enable shareholders to see which firms exhibit a pattern of making
mistaken selective disclosures. The inclusion of the identity of the
recipient in the new Form 8-K requirement would also deter repeated

357. See Brudney, supra note 234, at 336 (“[A] prime function of the disclosure
system . . . is to prevent a costly breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
stockholders . . . .”). See generally Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda,
Related-Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 153, 155 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
358. Cf. Brown et al. (2015), supra note 31, at 14 (quoting an analyst describing
how managers have “figured out how to ‘paper things up’ [with an 8-K]”).
359. Just as is currently the case, this could be done on the basis that the firm’s
disclosure is not deemed to be an admission that the information is material. See
Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51,723.
360. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 152–153.
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disclosures to the same investors by allowing other shareholders to
monitor such activity.
The substantial value invested in acquiring access to private
meetings raises questions regarding the criteria managers use to select
information recipients. Investors would be better placed to assess the
risk of self-dealing and how managers use information as corporate
property if firms disclosed their principles for shareholder and investor
engagement. This information could be provided in their proxy
statements. Such disclosure could include the methods employed for
selection of investors and analysts to meet, the amount of meetings
senior managers participated in during the previous year, the extent to
which the firm employs quiet or close periods, as well as the firm’s
objectives or reasons for private investor meetings. Investors at large
would also benefit from knowing whether firms meet with particular
selected investors or analysts regularly, in order to assess management’s
choice of counterparties for ongoing relationships in information
trading, whether for purposes of monitoring as envisaged in Dirks,
provision of liquidity in the firm’s stock,361 or other reasons. This Article
therefore recommends that the SEC consider such additional annual
disclosure.
These proposals would improve the ability of shareholders to make
a broad assessment of the risk of self-dealing in corporate property.
Investors would, however, not be able to detect all disclosures of valuerelevant or even material information in private meetings for three main
reasons. First, firms themselves undertake the materiality determination
and may use their discretion to place the threshold higher than the SEC
or the courts intended.362 Mistakes about materiality, whether honest or
dishonest, in a private meeting where only one officer of the firm
participates may never be discovered and disclosed to the market as the
SEC intended. Second, information may be value-relevant even if it is
not material under the securities laws.363 Third, the SEC’s enforcement
activity in relation to Reg. FD may not create much deterrence and
managers may consequently consider a violation as a project with

361.
362.

See supra note 51.
For an example, see Motorola Report, supra note 190, in which in-house
counsel made an incorrect assessment of the application of the terms “material” and
“nonpublic.”
363. See supra Section I.A.
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expected net positive value. To tackle these concerns, a more
comprehensive approach is required.
This Article recommends that the SEC embrace the Supreme
Court’s treatment of corporate information as firm property by
regulating selective disclosure as a conflicted-interest transaction.
Following this approach, the SEC should recognize that firms may
transact in their own information for the benefit of shareholders. It
should also recognize that such transactions involve managerial conflicts
of interest that are better assessed by the firm’s shareholders than the
SEC. Firms should consequently disclose private investor meetings as
transactions in order to inform their shareholders and allow them to
evaluate such meetings via the stock price.
An initial question about the design of a transaction reporting rule
is which party should be required to disclose. One could consider a
disclosure obligation placed on recipients of selective disclosure to the
effect that they should disclose when they trade the firm’s shares after
receiving NPI from a firm, similar to the requirement on the firm’s own
directors and officers.364 However, such a regime would quickly become
unworkable when we consider that NPI may be relayed to other entities,
for instance, by sell-side analysts, before it is used for trading. Tying the
rule to trading activities would thus make it under-inclusive and easy to
bypass through the establishment of informal chains for information
dissemination. It appears most efficient to instead place the disclosure
requirement on the SEC-registrant issuer, which ensures uniform
disclosure that is easy to locate. Best practices in investor relations
already involve keeping records of private meetings and other methods
of selective disclosure, 365 so firms will already have a compliance
framework in place to collect this data. For purposes of efficient
enforcement, the SEC may also consider it useful to require investment
managers and broker-dealers to keep internal records of their private
interactions with public firms, in order for the regulator to have two
sources to review in cases of suspicious trading activity.
In drawing up the revised regulation, the SEC would need to decide
which transactions ought to be disclosed. Since the disclosing firm will
not be aware of the value the recipient may derive from a transaction,

364.
365.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
GUIMARD, supra note 30, at 191.
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this cannot form the basis for the disclosure threshold.366 Similarly, it
appears difficult to require firms to value the consideration received,
since it is typically in intangible form such as loyalty or goodwill.
Materiality is also not a suitable threshold for the three reasons outlined
earlier in this subsection. Instead, the purpose of the transaction could
serve as a screening device. The proposed disclosure obligation could
thus target communications with securities market professionals, such as
analysts and investors, as well as others that may be expected to trade in
the market using the information. The boundaries of such a disclosure
obligation could be refined to ensure that it only catches completed
transactions in information. The SEC could, for example, stipulate that a
firm that releases NPI by mistake in a private meeting be exempt from
disclosing that as a transaction if the recipient agrees not to trade, since
any trading in such a case would violate the insider trading prohibition.
The SEC will also need to consider what information ought to be
reported about the information transactions. It must be recognized that it
would be a large administrative burden to require managers to keep
detailed notes of conversations.367 It is also undesirable to publicize the
details of private discussions, as it may cause managers and investors to
participate in fewer beneficial meetings. To accomplish deterrence of
undesirable transactions, it should be enough to require disclosure of the
fact that an information transaction occurred. Additionally, although it is
not feasible to require details on recipient trading to be publicized,
shareholders should be given the opportunity to assess the value
conferred by managers. Thus, it seems reasonable to include in the
transaction reporting some standard details about the meeting such as
the identity of the counterparty, date, start and end time, and a brief
description of the corporate purpose of the meeting. These details will
allow shareholders to determine whether the firm is communicating with
investors before it issues public disclosures, which would indicate that it
is monetizing NPI that will be publicly disclosed in the short term.368
Such transaction reporting will assist shareholders and investors in their
assessment of whether managers are undertaking beneficial transactions,
366.
367.

See supra text accompanying notes 284-285.
But cf. Solomon & Soltes, supra note 42 (suggesting firms should publicly
provide transcripts of private meetings).
368. As even firms that claim to have quiet periods do not abide by them (see
Section III.D.2), disclosure of dates and times of private interactions is necessary to
give shareholders the correct view of how managers monetize firm property.
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the risk of managerial self-dealing, as well as the amount of asymmetric
information to expect in the market for an individual firm’s stock.
Selective disclosure transactions could be reported at regular
intervals with some delay, for example, quarterly or semi-annually, as
the purpose is not to prevent recipients from profiting on the information
or to allow non-participating investors to trade on it, but to provide
investors with the tools to assess the risk of self-dealing and ability to
exercise oversight of how managers are using NPI as the property of the
firm. The SEC could stipulate that firms make this information available
on their websites. The SEC could also allow firms or investors to
request that particularly sensitive meetings be anonymized for some
period. From the perspective of the recipients, the publicity of the fact
that they have met management should be a small price to pay for an
information advantage provided by the firm and indirectly paid for by its
shareholders as a group.
C. BENEFITS OF INCREASED TRANSPARENCY
Public enforcement is costly and difficult to the point where the
SEC appears subdued, concluding an enforcement action biennially at
the current rate. At the time of writing, the SEC is on a record run of
over three years without Reg. FD enforcement actions. While the SEC
imposes penalties at a frequency and magnitude unlikely to produce
much deterrence, the fact that the stock market reacts negatively to
announcements of Reg. FD violations may be a more effective
deterrent.369 Firms who are seen to be engaging in selective disclosure
practices that shareholders consider undesirable or inefficient may see
their share prices decline. However, firms that meet with skillful
investors who have a reputation for diligent monitoring may instead see
their stock prices react favorably.370 With the new framework proposed
369. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1131-32 (2003)
(positing that the “explicit monitoring by the boards of directors” may be
complemented by “implicit monitoring by the market,” and noting that firm disclosure
policies may impact the quality of market monitoring). See Section II.C, supra, for the
discussion of how share price losses on the announcement of Reg. FD violations are
larger than the penalties imposed by the SEC.
370. The stock market is able to attribute reputation value to actions by investors
who have better track records; see C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S.
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herein, such firms can credibly distinguish themselves from firms with
worse disclosure practices and will have a clear incentive to do so. The
requirement to disclose meeting details would consequently both deter
undesirable behavior and reward prudent behavior.
Another benefit stems from the difficulties the SEC is facing under
the current Reg. FD that relate to tracking the flow of information, an
activity which is very expensive. The new framework would make SEC
enforcement easier by providing the opportunity to review transactions
to ascertain whether they were conducted using material NPI. It would
also allow other market participants and the media to review disclosure
transactions, similar to how insiders’ transaction reporting obligations
allow for efficient scrutiny and deterrence. From an SEC enforcement
perspective, the suggested shift in focus to the information transaction
rather than the information itself, could also be easier to enforce: since at
least two parties are required for selective disclosure, a requirement to
keep records of the basic details of meetings would allow the SEC to
inspect records of either party to ensure firms’ public disclosures are
correct.371 Requiring analysts and investors to keep records of their nonpublic interactions with public firms, with penalties imposed for failures
to do so, would also allow the SEC to break the circularity problem that
plagues the enforcement of securities actions.372 By requiring such third
parties to keep records, against which the disclosures of public firms can
be verified, the probability of full disclosure by the public firms
themselves increases.
This Article does not suggest that there is any magic formula of
meetings or a certain type of investor that firms ought to be meeting
with. Depending on their individual circumstances, firms would be
expected to establish different strategies for deployment of their
information. Some firms may wish to selectively disclose information to
specific analysts who have high credibility in order to disseminate some
Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation,
Clout, and Expertise (Vanderbilt Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 15-9, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589992 [http://perma.cc/6PR7-3JM4].
371. Given the collective action problem among active investors, discussed in
Section III.D.1, supra, the transaction reporting approach proposed herein would
instead allow public enforcement to be focused on the quality of firms’ public
disclosures, in order to ensure that they are not unduly convoluted to increase the value
of private disclosures.
372. Cf. Arlen & Carney, supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing how
monetary penalties may not deter if ultimately paid by innocent shareholders).
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specific datum to the market, while other firms may desire higher
liquidity in their stock and meet with certain investors for that purpose.
A secondary effect of a regulation that permits firms to
acknowledge that they monetize their NPI will also be that firms can be
transparent with shareholders and disclose details on their process for
selecting which investors to meet with, what the purposes of such
meetings are, and how they benefit the firm. Transparent treatment of
corporate transactions in NPI should lead to a more transparent market
for its transfer and to more efficiently priced transactions in information.
Transparency will also improve the stock market’s monitoring ability,
which in turn increases the likelihood that managers will be deterred
from entering into undesirable NPI transactions.
Furthermore, this Article is agnostic about the suitable placement of
the materiality threshold employed for Reg. FD enforcement in an
environment where firms inform investors of the scope of their
information transactions. It instead considers the main problems with
selective disclosure to be the risk of unmonitored self-dealing and the
absence of internal and external oversight of significant corporate
transactions. For example, if a firm were to inform investors that it may
sell its quarterly results announcements a week in advance to one
selected investor via an auction, the bid-ask spread should adjust to
account for this. As the SEC’s current enforcement fails to produce
deterrence, the SEC could instead consider whether its oversight should
be replaced by transparent disclosure practices by firms. The idea is
simple: investors cannot be deceived if firms are fully transparent about
their selective disclosure transactions, and with full transparency the
SEC can shift its focus from undertaking complicated and expensive
investigations into the details of private conversations, which at best
result in miniscule penalties unlikely to produce deterrence, to ensuring
that firms provide complete reporting of their selective disclosure
transactions.
Another efficiency benefit of the new framework is that it allows
analysts and other information traders the opportunity to assess the
amount of current information trading in a firm’s stock supplied by the
firm itself. This transparency may help direct analyst resources to the
firms offering the most promising opportunities for information trading.
The new framework would also inform shareholders about the
amount of investor monitoring in firms. Since managers choose their
own monitors and meetings are entirely private, investors at large are
currently unable to distinguish firms whose managers subject
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themselves to more frequent monitoring by expert investors from firms
where managers are not participating in private meetings at all, do so
only rarely, or only meet investors with little skill or interest in
monitoring. Giving shareholders information about selective disclosure
events would consequently increase the likelihood that the benefits of
selective disclosure that the Supreme Court envisaged in Dirks actually
accrue to shareholders at large.
Finally, while this Article is focused on federal securities
regulation, the disclosure of transactions in firm information may
provide shareholders with information they currently lack to pursue
claims under state corporate law.373
D. COSTS OF INCREASED TRANSPARENCY
One cost of the new framework is that some firms could currently
be transacting in private information with many investors who all
believe they have a unique level of management access. When such
firms need to disclose their information transactions, some investors
may realize that they do not have a privileged position for information
trading and decide to participate in fewer meetings. However, this is not
necessarily a social loss since the reporting obligation may deter
unnecessary activity.
Disclosure is generally seen as a relatively inexpensive regulatory
strategy. The proposal involves additional costs for record-keeping and
publishing, but this would not be expected to impose a significant
burden.374
As with any regulation, there is a risk of over-deterrence. The aim
of the proposed regulation is to deter selective disclosure transactions
which reduce firm value (as judged by stock market investors) but there
is no reason to fear that increased disclosure would deter favorable
transactions. For this reason, the revised rule would not have any
significant negative effects on market efficiency.
Over-enforcement could also be a risk. However, the current Reg.
FD offers no private right of action, and this proposal would not do so
373. Delaware courts have long considered insider trading a breach of the duty of
loyalty. See Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949). For a more recent
confirmation of this principle, see Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010). The
application of state law is outside the scope of this Article.
374. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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either. Enforcement of full selective disclosure transaction reporting is
envisaged via the SEC, which can hardly be blamed for over-enforcing
the current Reg. FD. The aim is to allow the SEC to let the market
penalize undesirable selective disclosures, so that the regulator only
needs to take action when it notices transgressions that may constitute
insider trading.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER RESEARCH
This Article will conclude by noting its relevance to some other
ideas. The recent removal of the requirement for European Union firms
to publish quarterly reports appears to have been met with approval by
at least one influential commentator in the United States.375 This Article
has argued that public disclosure is one of several methods for corporate
managers to deploy NPI and that a reduced amount of public disclosure
will increase the value of the information under managers’ control. This
is particularly so in the U.S., where federal securities regulation does
not, in contrast to European rules, contain a general requirement for
immediate disclosure of material information. Accordingly, fewer public
disclosures would be expected to intensify investor demand for private
meetings and consequently increase the utility of the new disclosure
obligation advocated herein.
Finally, to end with a wider perspective, this Article has reviewed
an activity in which only active investors, by definition, participate.
While firms may derive important benefits from selective disclosure of
information, active investors also expend significant resources to obtain
private information from public firms. While the amount of money spent
compensating brokers for provision of corporate access services is
notable, it must be the case that amounts several magnitudes greater are
spent by active investors on procuring and attempting to profit from
private information, considering that they require private information to
outperform and survive in the long term. Active investment activities
can improve price discovery and the efficient allocation of resources in

375. See Martin Lipton, Legal & General Calls for End to Quarterly Reporting,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (Aug. 19, 2015) http://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2015/08/19/legal-general-calls-for-end-to-quarterly-reporting [https://
perma.cc/CA7S-35HJ].
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society but active investment products can still be overproduced. 376
From the perspective of the ultimate investors in active investment
vehicles, the risk is that private investor meetings manifest a collective
action problem where investment managers participate in an expensive
and largely futile pursuit of private information instead of agreeing on a
general demand for public firms to issue high-quality public disclosure
for common benefit. As this collective action problem may even result
in investors with private access demanding less public disclosure, 377
improved transparency of the extent to which managers of public firms
and professional investors engage in these activities could provide a
positive externality by allowing ultimate investors the opportunity to
assess the scale and perceived utility of private investor meetings as a
phenomenon. At the same time, neither active investors nor corporate
managers would be expected to support a proposal as outlined herein,
since the current regulatory framework affords them significant
discretion to effectuate value transfers from other investors. Such
conflicts highlight why disclosure regulation needs to be mandatory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has aimed to do four things.
First, it has tried to introduce the phenomenon and function of
investor meetings, show that it is an activity that both firms and
investors spend significant resources on, and that it is useful and
interesting to review the practices that have been established within the
investor relations field from a securities law perspective.
Second, it sought to show that the current regulation of selective
disclosure fails to deter violations. It did so by showing that Reg. FD
does not fulfill its stated purposes and that corporate managers can hand
out very valuable information to favored investors at a very low
expected cost to themselves.
Third, it suggested that we ought to place further emphasis on
agency costs within the disclosure system. Building on the Supreme
Court’s recognition that firm-specific NPI is the firm’s property, it
suggested a classification of the various methods in which a corporate
376. French, supra note 330, has estimated that society’s capitalized cost of active
investing (which includes all active investment strategies and not just those where
investors meet with managers) exceeds 10% of the capitalization of the stock market.
377. See supra Section III.D.1 for the discussion of collective action problems.
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manager as agent may consider her alternatives for deployment of the
firm’s information. Reviewing the regulation of these alternative
methods, it found selective disclosure to be an attractive method for
managers and their favored investors to extract private benefits from
public firms.
Finally, the Article suggested that it would be more efficient if a
method was introduced that allowed for oversight over managers’
dealings in their firms’ valuable information. It proposed that a selective
disclosure event should be treated as a transaction that is similar to
equity raising from uninformed shareholders and susceptible to
conflicted managerial interests, and that firms should be required to
report such transactions in order to allow shareholder oversight and
investor assessment via the stock price.

